President of Turkmenistan Extends his Term

A picture of Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov riding a horse, displayed outside the national horse-racing grounds in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan

A new constitution for Turkmenistan has been drafted by President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov and his cabinet, which is set to extend presidential term limits to seven years and removes the previous age limit of 70 for presidential candidates, the Guardian reports. Berdymukhamedov, 58, is nearing the end of his second term after being reelected in 2012, and this move will likely secure him the presidency for the rest of his life.

Berdymukhamedov is the second president in Turkmenistan’s post-1991 history, coming into power after his eccentric predecessor, Saparmurat Niyazov, died in 2006. Niyazov, who began his leadership of Turkmenistan back in 1985 as First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Turkmen SSR, established an extensive cult of personality around himself, comparable to the cults surrounding the Kim Dynasty. Niyazov’s Turkmenistan was criticized by international observers as highly repressive and totalitarian, as virtually no opposition existed and the citizens of the country were largely powerless to whatever he decreed, no matter how bizarre they may be. Among the stranger laws put in place under Niyazov, he renamed the months of the year after family members, banned dogs from the Turkmen capital of Ashgabat for their “unappealing odor”, barred news reporters from wearing makeup on television (as he could not tell the difference between the male and female anchors), and had an ice rink built outside the capital. Keep in mind that Turkmenistan is, quite literally, a desert. As “President for Life”, Niyazov was only “elected” once in 1992, and had complete and absolute control over Turkmenistan. His irresponsible and total rule went unquestioned and unpunished until his death.

When Saparmurat Niyazov died in 2006, Berdymukhamedov, a dentist by profession, quickly became the acting president, and was “elected” in 2007 with over 89% of the vote. Since then, he has made moves to abolish the personality cult around his predecessor; at the same time, however, he has instead created a personality cult around himself. Like Niyazov before him, Berdymukhamedov has a golden statue of himself in Ashgabat as well, rotating in such a fashion that it is always facing the sun. Although he may not be as repressive as Niyazov, he is far from an protector of human rights (despite his personal title of “Arkadag,” which means “protector” in Turkmen”). One of his more recent acts was to ban air conditioning units in the heat of the summer due to them looking ugly outside of buildings.

However, a key difference between Berdymukhamedov and his predecessor is that unlike Niyazov, he has not been made “president for life”, and thus still has technical term limits and musts technically run for “reelection”. The word “election” throughout this article is in quotations because of the fact that in the country’s brief history, Turkmenistan has never held a free and fair election. But during the Niyazov regime, he was only elected once (in 1992; Niyazov was declared President for Life in 1999 by decree of the rump parliament); this made Turkmenistan somewhat distinguished in this field from the rest of the Central Asian nations, at least for a time. Dictators such as Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan and Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan, for example, at least went through the formalities of staging an election, no matter how rigged and unfair they may have been and still are.

But once Berdymukhamedov came to power, the Turkmen Constitution was amended to limit the president’s term to up to five years, making it a requirement for him to run for reelection. And although there was not a limit on the amount of times the president would be able to run, it did have an age limit on the eligibility of the candidate: the president must be no older than 70 in order to serve.

And now, not only are the terms being extended to seven years, but the age cap is likely to be abolished as well. The updated constitution is expected to be passed later this year by the parliament of Turkmenistan, which, much like the rest of the country, follow the will of the president. So this means that Berdymukhamedov, 58, who already has near-absolute power in the neutral country of five million, will be able to continue his presidency likely until the day he dies.

This surely comes as no surprise to anyone who has even mildly followed the dictator over the past few years. Although Berdymukhamedov has attempted to show to the international community that he has made some modest reforms, such as the allowance of certain opposition parties to form (until 2012, Turkmenistan was a one-party state), ultimately these reforms amount to nothing. In the end, Berdymukhamedov still maintains nearly total control over all aspects of Turkmen life, and now his rule has been secured for a very long time. Although he may not be officially labeled as “President for Life” like his predecessor, he might as well be so.

Ukrainian Prime Minister Survives No-Confidence Vote

US Secretary of State John Kerry with Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, pictured right

Ukraine’s Prime Minister, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, has survived a no-confidence vote in the Ukrainian Parliament, mere hours after Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko asked him to step down, BBC reports. This comes at a time when public confidence in the government has reached record lows, and Ukraine’s Western backers are beginning to lose patience with the slow pace of reforms and the high amounts of corruption in the government.

Earlier this week on February 16th, President Poroshenko, who heads the largest party in the Ukrainian Parliament of his namesake, the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, called on Yatsenyuk, the Prime Minister of Ukraine since the previous government was forced out nearly two years ago, and head of the People’s Front party (which is in a coalition with Poroshenko’s party), to resign. Very soon after, the Ukrainian Parliament, or the Rada, took two votes: the first determined that the cabinet’s work in the previous year towards reforms was unsatisfactory. The second, crucially, was on the no-confidence vote for Yatsenyuk, which failed to pass, with only 194 out of the 339 MPs voting for it (226 votes were needed for the vote to pass). If the no-confidence vote were to pass, then Yatsenyuk would have been ejected from the Premiership and a new government would likely have been formed; now that it has failed, neither is likely to happen.

Arseniy Yatsenyuk has been in Ukrainian politics for some time; he was Ukraine’s Minister of Economy in 2005 following the 2004 revolution in the country, Foreign Minister of the country in 2007, Parliament Chairman in 2008, and head of a small political faction in the years leading to 2014, while former President Yanukovych was leader of the country. After Yanukovych was ousted, Yatsenyuk quickly became Prime Minister of the country and created the pro-Western People’s Front party, which entered into a governing coalition with other pro-Western parties. However, with the loss of a major part of its territory due to the Russian annexation of Crimea and a rising insurgency in the East of the country, the pressure was on for Ukraine’s new government to perform well.

Sadly, the current government has not performed as well as many reform-minded Ukrainians would have hoped; in fact, most of the population is upset at the high levels of perceived corruption that still exist in government. This sentiment is nothing new. In a poll taken in December of last year, only 8.7% of the population reported to have faith in the government; another poll taken around the same time had that number at 7.8%. And recent polls show that support for Mr. Yatsenyuk’s People’s Front party is at 1%. Since the escalation of tensions with Russia, most Ukrainians have supported democratization efforts and better relations with the West. These views are echoed by the ruling coalition. And yet, a majority of Ukrainians also feel that their country is going in the wrong direction. Instead of receiving the reforms they wanted, many have argued that the situation in the country has only gotten worse, in light of a collapsed economy, devalued currency, lower living standards, and multiple accusations of corruption.

The calls for reform are almost deafening throughout the country, and now external powers are beginning to chime in as well. The International Monetary Fund, which helped bail out Ukraine when faced with debts to Russia, is now saying that they will withhold aid money if the country does not carry out on its promises for reform. And Ukraine’s Western backers, although perhaps a little more mild in their criticism, are nonetheless aggravated. I have recently commented on the resignation of Lithuanian-born Ukrainian Financial Minister Aivaras Abromavicius, which caused many Western powers to speak out in order to both urge him to come back, and also to criticize the government’s slow pace of reforms.

With increasingly frequent accusations of corruption and mismanagement in the government, Mr. Yatsenyuk has seen himself becoming less and less popular, which eventually led to President Poroshenko even calling for his resignation this past Tuesday. The Ukrainian President has called for officials to resign in the past, such as Ukraine’s former, controversial prosecutor general, Viktor Shokin, but this was the most important official he had called on to step down. And when Yatsenyuk narrowly survived the no-confidence vote (even though a majority of MPs voted against him, it was not enough to vote him out), it only made the governing coalition look even more fragmented and divided.

However, we should not see President Poroshenko as the moral barometer of Ukraine, as he is not much more popular than Yatsenyuk. Poroshenko promised deep, meaningful, and quick reforms. The Ukrainian people, who have not seen this type of radical reform that was meant to stamp out corruption, feel betrayed and lied to. Instead, they see corruption everywhere in government, and former officials like Abromavicius only seem to confirm their long-standing fears.

This weeks marks the two year anniversary since former President Yanukovych was ousted from power during the Euromaidan protests. In those protests, Ukrainians fought the corrupt government on the basis of democracy and Western values. Among them, Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk were lead figures in the protests. And yet, both of these men have betrayed the original values of the Euromaidan. Public dissatisfaction among the people of the protest for leading figures from the protest is far too high for these figures to still be representing the protests. For the sake of the revolution that brought it into power in the first place, Ukraine’s current government needs to disband, and a new government must form.

Montenegro Invited to Become 29th Member of NATO

Map of NATO countries (in green) and Montenegro (in orange)

Official talks have begun between NATO officials and the Balkan nation of Montenegro for the latter’s accession into the organization, Radio Free Europe reports. This comes after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization invited the small country to become its 29th member in December after reviewing its application to join, and comes with complaints from Serbia, which Montenegro was once a part of, and Russia, which sees Montenegro joining the organization as continued NATO expansionism and a threat.

The most recent expansion of NATO occurred in 2009, with the accession of Albania and Croatia to the organization, two more countries in the Western Balkans. Montenegro officially started its talks to join the alliance in 2010, after it was given a Membership Action Plan, a mechanism that allows NATO members to formally and frequently review applications of aspiring countries. Currently, three countries have the MAP: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro. All three are Western Balkan nations once part of Yugoslavia. These final rounds of talks between Montenegro and NATO are meant to clarify and solve “outstanding issues”, and could be complete as early as the next NATO summit in Warsaw this July.

NATO’s decision to invite Montenegro immediately drew the ire of Serbia, Russia, and even some elements from within Montenegro itself. However, to fully understand the controversial nature of Montenegro’s accession to NATO, one must look at the country’s recent history. During the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 90s, Montenegro remained a part of Serbia, or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as it was known during the time. And during the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, NATO allied itself with Kosovar separatists and bombed Yugoslav positions, including several times in Montenegro. The intervention ended in a NATO victory, and was the second major combat operation in the organization’s history, after NATO’s bombing campaign in Bosnia and Herzegovina only a few years before. However, anti-NATO sentiment was very high afterwards, particularly in Serbia.

In the early 2000s, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia went through immense reforms, largely due to increasing separatist feelings in Montenegro. Earlier, Montenegro had already adopted the German Deutsche Mark, and later even adopted the Euro as its official currency (although it is not part of the Eurozone). In 2003, the FR Yugoslavia underwent further decentralization and was renamed the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. Finally, in 2006, Montenegrins narrowly voted for independence in a referendum that saw 55.5% vote for, only just passing the 55% threshold to validate the vote. Montenegro very soon after declared its independence, with no country objecting.

However, the closeness of the results in the independence referendum highlight the fractured nature of Montenegrin society. Although a slight majority of the population wish for closer ties with the West, a large portion still remember the country’s Serbian ties and, more importantly, NATO’s intervention in the former Yugoslavia. Although the government of Montenegro has been pushing for NATO membership for quite some time, there are major Montenegrin opposition parties that are very against joining the organization. This schism is reflected in the population as well: in a poll taken in 2014, 46% of the population was for NATO membership, while 42% was against. In response to the recent invitation, thousands of protesters have marched out in the streets of the Montenegrin capital in opposition.

Russia also sees NATO expansionism as a threat to itself. From Russia’s point of view, during the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union’s NATO equivalent with Eastern European countries, an understanding was reached between Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and the West that outside of East Germany, which would be reunited with West Germany, NATO would “not move an inch” East. The fact that this promise was not only violated, with NATO expanding dramatically in 1997, 2004, and 2007 to include nearly all of the former Soviet satellites, in addition to the lack of coordination with Russia, is seen as a betrayal to many Russians. So whenever NATO expands, particularly in a country that is quite close to Russia, it seen as a direct threat to Russia. Serbia and Russia share deep historical and cultural ties, and these ties are also prevalent in Montenegro. Montenegro is a popular tourist destination for Russians, and since independence large amounts of Russian money has come to the country.

Since Montenegro was invited into the Alliance, Russia has called on the nation to hold a referendum, as seen in this BBC article, citing the “deep divisions” in the Balkan nation over the issue. And Russia, for its part, is right. For such an important issue as joining a major bloc such as NATO, a comfortable majority is needed. Regarding NATO’s two newest members, Croatia and Albania, polls before joining the alliance show 52% of the population for joining with 25% against in the former, while in Albania an overwhelming majority, 95%, of the population were for accession to NATO. In Montenegro, the percentage of those for is much less clear.

However, if the Montenegrin government and NATO get their way, no referendum will take place. Montenegro’s Prime Minister has resisted calls for a referendum, and NATO officials point to opinion polls that have Montenegrins slightly in favor of joining. However, if it is only slightly in favor, then shouldn’t a confidence vote take place in order to more firmly gauge the public’s attitude towards this? Of course, there is a chance that the referendum may not get a majority for membership, but if NATO is (or at least, is supposed to be) an alliance of democratic countries, then shouldn’t they respect the democratic process?

Although I may not agree with all of the motives of Russia for opposing Montenegro’s accession to NATO, I firmly believe in the self-determination of all peoples. The Montenegrin opposition parties opposed to NATO membership must more strongly push for a referendum on the matter, and a clear majority must be needed in order to continue any further into the alliance. Otherwise, it will look very hypocritical for Western countries, which supposedly support freedom and democracy, and give Russia yet another talking point in “proving” the ill intentions of NATO.

Trial of Islamic Opposition in Tajikistan Begins

 

Picture of Emomali Rahmon, President of Tajikistan

Thirteen members of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan have been put on trial behind closed doors in the capital of the Central Asian nation of Tajikistan, Yahoo News reports.  The members of the party, which was banned last year, face charges ranging from attempting to overthrow the constitutional order and organizing a criminal group. Many suspect that the real reason for the trial, however, is to formally crush the only Islamist party in Central Asia, as well as any real opposition to Tajik President Emomali Rahmon.

The Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan was formed a little before Tajikistan’s independence from the Soviet Union. However, very early on in the new country’s history, it banned the party. During the Tajik Civil War between 1992 and 1997, the IRPT fought as one of the largest and most influential groups in the United Tajik Opposition, a group of rebels that ranged in ideology from democratic reformists to nationalists to Islamists. Altogether, the war saw anywhere between 50,000 and 100,000 killed, and 1.2 million people displaced within their own country. Eventually, in 1997, the Tajik government, led by Rahmon, and the Opposition signed a UN-sponsored peace deal, in which Rahmon agreed to give at least 30% of government positions to his opponents in the War. This included the IRPT, which describes its ideology as Islamic Democracy.

The Islamist party was, at one point very soon after the Civil War, the second largest party in Tajikistan. However, Rahmon has slowly ebbed the power and significance of the IRPT until its ranks fell. After some years, it become clear that the President had no intention of keeping the deal reached in the armistice. Before parliamentary elections last year, the party only had two seats in Parliament; after the “elections” on March 1st, 2015, they failed to pass the necessary threshold for seats, and thus were expelled from the Parliament of Tajikistan. Beforehand and shortly afterwards, members of the party complained about government harassment and accusations of terrorism, which undermined the party’s legitimacy. To be clear, the Islamic Renaissance Party fought alongside democratic forces in the Civil War; they may not be the most liberally-minded, but they are not terrorists.

However, that is not the opinion of President Rahmon, who takes pride in his secular government and seems terrified at even the slightest hint of Islam in the society of the Muslim-majority nation. For example, there have been recent reports of the Tajik police forcefully shaving men’s beards and discarding traditional Islamic dress, and the Tajik Parliament recently voted to ban all traditional Arabic and other “non-Tajik” names for newborn babies. In August last year, once it was clear that the IRPT had lost its threatening two seats, Rahmon declared the party illegal, removing the group of the title of the only legal Islamist party in Central Asia. In September, clashes broke out between Tajik police and followers of a former deputy defense minister, resulting in the deaths of over 50 people and the arrests of nearly 200. The government of Tajikistan blamed the IRPT, despite the group claiming innocence, and quickly designated its members part of a terrorist group and compared them to the Islamic State.

And now, members from the group are on trial on trumped-up charges in an anything-but-fair courtroom. In the months before the trial, there have already been serious and credible accusations of mistreatment and torture of the party members to be in the courtroom, as well as harassment of their defense. This trial will go just as President Rahmon wants: with each and every defendant being declared guilty of every charge and the members of the party being shamed nationwide as terrorists.

One of the more interesting charges against the IRPT members on trials is that they tried to overthrow the government; once again, they did not. Although this group does advocate for political Islam, it is not fundamentalist, and has long abandoned militaristic Islam. It does not support violence or terrorism, and the government’s accusations that they are comparable to the Islamic State is inflammatory and wrong. They have no interest in overthrowing the government; but with Rahmon attempting to dispose entirely of the party, the President may be doing this on his own.

Let’s ignore the fact that the move of banning one of the major opposition parties is absolutely undemocratic; Tajikistan has always had a problem with democracy. But it is important to keep in mind that the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan was one of the largest members of the Tajik Opposition in the Civil War, and once peace was reached, they were the largest party out of the entire former Opposition. Even if, eventually, they became a defunct part of the Parliament as the President’s party dominated Tajikistan, they were still a very symbolic part of the modern order created in the country. By labeling one of the keepers of that order a terrorist group comparable to the Islamic State, the government threatens not only the order of the country, but its own rule.

Furthermore, the persecution of the IRPT and Islam in society in general has not sat well with quite a few Muslims in Tajikistan. Hundreds of Tajiks, including a former special forces chief, are already confirmed to have joined the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. For many, the reason was simple: they were not able to freely practice their religion in a country where the large majority of the population is Muslim. The Islamic Renaissance Party was moderate; but young, disillusioned Muslims angry at the government can easily become radicalized and even violent. This represents a threat not only to Rahmon, but to all of Tajikistan itself, and it is not unreasonable to think that this threat could present itself in the near future.

At this point, the biggest threat to President Emomali Rahmon is not the Islamic Renaissance Party, but Emomali Rahmon himself. Unless he reverses course immediately in order to not force his society to be secular (which would be quite the surprise indeed, as he appears to be going increasingly in that direction), then his actions could potentially spark an insurgency or even a Civil War, although this time the opposition would be far more extreme and far less democratic.

Ramzan Kadyrov: A Man of Fiery Words

Russian President Vladimir Putin (L) with Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov (R)

The comments of the President of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov, have recently drawn concerns from human rights activists and opposition members, NPR and NBC report. Among other statements, Kadyrov has reacted with animosity towards any opposition groups, calling them “traitors” and “enemies of the state”, and even insinuating that those who go against the Russian government could be persecuted through extrajudicial means.

The Chechen Republic, more commonly known to the world as Chechnya, is one of the few Muslim-majority federal subjects of the Russian Federation. However, during the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the territory currently comprising of Chechnya declared independence as the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, one of several breakaway states that arose during this time across the former Soviet Union. Chechnya was unique, however, for being the only breakaway republic on Russian territory. It is also unique for being the only breakaway republic that no longer exists today. Although one might have thought that Chechnya would become a frozen conflict zone due to winning a war with Russia that lasted over a year and a half in 1994, a second Russian-Chechen War in 1999 ended in a decisive Russian victory. The brutal Second Chechen War is largely attributed with the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s presidency in Russia, and his actions to take back Chechnya are what won many Russians over to the new president. A pro-Russian government was established as Chechnya was absorbed into Russia, while an Islamist insurgency persists today.

Much like Chechnya today, Ramzan Kadyrov is a man who has changed allegiances over the past two decades. The son of Akhmad Kadyrov, a prominent Muslim imam, Ramzan originally fought in the First Chechen War on the side of Chechnya as a rebel. However, in the Second Chechen War, he changed sides to fighting for Russia, largely because he and his father had grown worried of the increasingly radical Islamist fighters on the Chechen side. Once Russia had reestablished its rule in Chechnya, Akhmad Kadyrov was made president of the region; however, he was assassinated in 2004. That same year, Ramzan was made Deputy Prime Minister of Chechnya, and slowly made his way up the ladder until he was appointed President of Chechnya by President Putin in 2007. Since then, Kadyrov has aligned himself very closely with the Russian President. In 2009, he led a successful operation against Islamist militants that pushed them out of hideouts in the North Caucasus mountains (although a low-level insurgency still exists today), and has also largely rebuilt the Chechen capital of Gronzy, which in 2003 was labelled by the UN as the “most destroyed city on Earth” after the Second Chechen War.

Kadyrov’s regime is not without criticism, however, and the accusations against him are very severe. Many describe his rule as authoritarian. People around him, and Kadyrov himself, have been accused of attacking and murdering political opponents, charges which he has always denied. But his most recent comments have been the most acidic against opposition figures, and the closest Kadyrov and his allies have ever come to outright saying that they plan assassinations of those who get in their way.

At a pro-government rally in Chechnya, Adam Delimkhanov, a close political ally of Kadyrov, stated that “we have the lists of them [political enemies] in our pockets. Wherever they are, they will answer according to the law…and not by the law.” Many opposition figures interpreted this comment as a direct threat to their well-being, and with good reason. The Chechen parliament speaker posted a picture on Instagram of Kadyrov’s dog, Tarzan, with an added description that “Tarzan’s fangs itch whenever he sees people from the opposition.” But perhaps the boldest comments came from Kadyrov himself, as he said in a recent interview that, in reference to opposition figures, “they are enemies of our state, and wherever they appear, any patriot ought to smash their faces, because they’re not citizens of Russia, they’re the enemies of our people.” These lines would be routine and commonplace in Soviet times; but in modern-day Russia, it is certainly unusual to outright state such violent remarks towards opposition figures, even if repression of political enemies is widely practiced.

Of course, in each fiery statement by Kadyrov and his allies, they never specifically singled out one individual; but the list of potential political enemies is long. From politicians, to journalists, to human rights activists, the local government has used intimidation and assassination against these groups that criticize Kadyrov. Some call the Chechen leader a spitting image of Vladimir Putin; others say he is even more brutal. In addition to repression within Chechnya, there have been some reports that he has taken measures to silence dissent outside of his federal subject in other parts of Russia.

Kadyrov’s comments have received immense backlash from international human rights groups as well as some criticism within Russia, as many opposition figures in Chechnya now fear from upsetting the government more than ever. And President Putin has offered nothing but praise, hailing President Kadyrov for his “effective work” just this past week. And as Kadyrov is a Putin ally, he seems to enjoy almost absolute rule in Chechnya.

However, this may not last. As a federal subject of Russia, about 83% of Chechnya’s 2016 budget comes from Moscow. And with the Russian economy in decline, Chechnya’s main backer may not allocate as much money towards it. This would be a major blow towards Kadyrov, as it is funds from Moscow that helps legitimize his power. But aside from that, there is also the renewed threat of Islamist extremism to worry about. Although Kadyrov’s forces pushed back Chechen terrorists in 2009, many Chechens have left their native land to join the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. If and when they come back, Chechnya could have a renewed and reinvigorated insurgent problem on its hands. Already last year, militants launched an attack on the Chechen capital that killed at least 20 people, including 12 policemen.

No matter what Kadyrov may think, he does not have absolute power. He is in charge of a region of Russia, and a volatile region at that. However, in regards to the power that he does enjoy, he abuses it. His actions against opposition figures in Chechnya are cruel and unacceptable. As an ally of Putin, there is no chance of being brought to justice in Russia; however, the international community must stand up in opposition to Kadyrov’s harmful actions. Because even for Russian politics, his methods are extreme.

Ukraine Economy Minister Quits Amid Struggles for Reform

Aivaras Abromavicius, Ukraine’s Economy Minister

Ukrainian Economy Minister Aivaras Abromavicius quit this past Wednesday over complaints that his ministry was filled with corrupt officials, Reuters reports. This sudden loss comes at a time when many in Ukraine are beginning to lose hope that the current government will be able to act meaningful reforms in order to curb the rampant corruption that exists and effectively modernize the country.

In an official statement, Abromavicius stated that one of the major reasons for his resignation was a dispute with one of Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko’s close aides, Ihor Kononenko, accusing him of halting reforms from the economy ministry as well as putting allies in positions of power. But outside of this very specific mention, Abromavicius also stated that there was far too much corruption across the board in Ukraine, even within his own ministry, which helped shape his decision to leave the post.

Aivaras Abromavicius, once an asset manager from Lithuania, was drawn into Ukraine in 2014 after the ousting of the pro-Russian government during the Euromaidan protests as one of many foreign experts to help run the new government, which hoped to reform itself to back a highly-functioning democracy and align the country more closely with the West. With Abromavicius as Economy Minister, the country has set plans to privatize 100 state-owned companies in order to save Ukraine’s faltering economy; but with him leaving, the privatization plans are on uneasy grounds.

In his resignation statement, Abromavicius said that, among many other signs of corruption, senior lawmaker Kononenko pressured him to get people loyal to him as heads of state companies; near the end, he even tried to get one of his allies as Abromavicius’s own deputy. “Neither me, nor my team have any desire to serve as a cover-up for the covert corruption, or become puppets for those who, very much like the ‘old’ government, are trying to exercise control over the flow of public funds,” Abromavicius said.

The departure of one of the more competent members of the Ukrainian government made many officials, from foreign and domestic governments, to urge him not to leave. A group of US, British, German, and other foreign envoys expressed “deep disappointment” by his resignation. For his part, President Poroshenko has backed an anti-corruption probe against Kononenko, which was launched a few days after the resignation, in order to attempt to convince Abromavicius to stay. This is not nothing; Kononenko is a very prominent and close ally to Poroshenko, with some even describing the senior lawmaker as the President’s own shadow. The fact that a probe has been launched into him without the protests, and even backing, from the President shows that the rule of law is slowly increasing in Ukraine.

“Slowly” is the key word here; and for Abromavicius and the majority of Ukrainians, these changes are coming too slowly. When the new government was sworn into office in 2014, they promised quick, meaningful reforms that would transform the country into a Western-style democracy. These promises have not been fulfilled. The Ukrainian economy shrank by more than a tenth last year, and citizens are dissatisfied with the pace of reforms as they, like Abromavicius, see corruption everywhere in the government. The government’s approval ratings has been on a steep and constant decline. Even Ukraine’s Western backers are beginning to grow exasperated with the government over the slowness of reform in the country. It is feeling almost too reminiscent of the Ukrainian “Orange Revolution” back in 2004: a popular protest led to a change in the government with pro-Western leaders, but political infighting and a failure to curb corruption led to the country turning back to Russia rather than going down the more democratic route. Although it would not be as easy this time for Ukraine to be drawn back into the Russian sphere of influence, seeing as how Russia has annexed of a part of its territory, it is an outcome that must at least be considered.

In this time of great instability, it is people like Abromavicius that Ukraine needs now more than ever. The reason Abromavicius become economy minister of the country was because he was an outsider: as a Lithuanian who does not even speak Ukrainian, he is completely removed outside of the corruption in the government that, although the government may be new, has remained consistent since the most recent revolution. People outside the system of corruption and graft are what are truly needed to reform a broken and unstable country. Abromavicius’s reforms, which include the privatization of major Ukrainian state companies, would do well for the crippled economy as well as for Ukraine. If Abromavicius leaves his position, it would certainly be a big loss to a country that would truly benefit his services.

Belarus’s New Military Doctrine

Members of the Belarusian and Russian Militaries

The Republic of Belarus has approved an updated version of the country’s military doctrine, the Belarusian Telegraph Agency, the official news agency of Belarus, has stated. The new military doctrine, previously updated in 2001, was approved by President Alexander Lukashenko on January 22nd this month following a meeting of the country’s Security Council.

According to Belarusian officials, the doctrine will be updated in response to the changing security threats facing the country in order to more appropriately defend Belarus. Some aspects of the doctrine that will remain the same are that the military will remain defense-oriented, and that it will only use force against aggressors if all other options have been exhausted. However, one noteworthy addition to the military doctrine is that, as well as taking into consideration external threats, internal threats were also highlighted as a growing concern, otherwise known as “hybrid wars”. This is quite a noteworthy addition to Belarus’s old doctrine, and reflects the growing concerns of the state.

A country’s military doctrine, a key document which directs when, where, and how a country’s armed forces should conduct themselves, often reflects the current events happening both in and out of the country. For example, the fact that in the military doctrine of Russia NATO expansionism is listed as a major external threat shows the widening schism between Russia and the West. It also shows the fact that NATO and the West have been of increasing concern to Vladimir Putin. Russia’s military doctrine says a lot about that country. And, for the authoritarian Eastern European nation of Belarus, its military doctrine says a lot about the country as well.

After a few years of independence, it quickly became clear that the Republic of Belarus, which has only had one “free and fair” election in its existence, was moving into the shattered Russian sphere of influence. Today, Russia remains Belarus’s most important partner, and Belarus probably remains Russia’s closest ally. Even among other post-Soviet states with close relations with Russia like Kazakhstan and Armenia, Belarus leads the group by far for having one of the most dependent relations with its neighbor to the East. It is dependent on Russia economically, through energy, and politically, as Russia often acts as a political shield to human rights abusers that criticize Belarus for its undemocratic standards.

However, despite the closeness in many areas, the relationship is far from perfect. The most recent point of contention is the entire Ukrainian Conflict, which has made Belarus much more weary of Russia’s dominance in the country. Throughout the conflict, Belarus has tried to remain as neutral and vague as possible, giving conflicting statements to not outright condemn Russia, but not defend Russia’s actions either. Although quite a few countries close to Russia have done so, Belarus has not explicitly recognized Crimea as a part of Russia. If anything, Belarus has attempted to act as a mediator in the conflict, hosting rounds of peace talks involving Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany last year.

The new military doctrine is largely in response to Ukraine. Although President Lukashenko would never in a million years state it outright, the reference to external threats in the document is almost certainly directed towards Russia rather than NATO. Since 2014, there have been mutterings among European politicians across the spectrum that Lukashenko may want to spread his country’s wings to more actively interact with other political spheres, if only so that Russia is not Belarus’s only partner. Although it would be unrealistic to believe that Belarus will become the next member of the European Union as a reformed, liberal democracy, Belarus could be trying to branch out to other parts of Europe. Too drastic a policy shift, some worry, could trigger Russia to act against its long-time ally. As President Lukashenko has said himself, “the contradictions between the Russian Federation and NATO member states have intensified, to say the least. Between them is Belarus, as if between a rock and a hard place.”

However, although there could be some signs that Russian-Belarusian relations are becoming slightly strained, the outcome or Russia becoming an immediate external threat to Belarus is unlikely to happen in the near future; at least not while Lukashenko is still in power. So the next most important part of the military doctrine is the addition of internal security threats, also referenced to as “hybrid wars”. By including this in the new doctrine, Belarus makes clear its stance on the color revolutions and popular uprisings that overthrew government regimes like the one in Ukraine in 2014, sparking the long conflict. Although such protests would be harder to undertake in tightly-restricted Belarus, the potential threat to power still has Lukashenko and other officials worried. Since the previous military doctrine was updated in 2001, there have been four governments that have been overthrown by popular protests in the post-Soviet space alone: one in Kyrgyzstan, one in Georgia, and two in Ukraine.

This is where Belarus’s Pro-Russian side comes in. Although he might be striking a tone of reconciliation with the West, at the end of the day he stays with Russia in order to protect his power. Belarus bans public gatherings and assemblies in the government due to fears that it may spark a protest. Any whiff of dissent, and officials come. Opposition figures are routinely harassed and any serious protests in the past have been brutally put down by the police. Although a color revolution in the country is not impossible, it would certainly be very difficult. And even if a popular protest was somehow able to oust Lukashenko, there is nothing stopping a covert Russian invasion of the country to force it within its sphere of influence. Although this idea may have seemed absurd five years ago, after Ukraine, it seems like a very possible course of action for Russia to take.

Belarus’s best chances for a democracy lie after Lukashenko leaves office, likely with his death. The best option for Belarus long-term would likely be if the government peacefully and gradually shifts from an authoritarian vassal of Russia into at least obtaining the most basic principles of democracy, something that would almost certainly not happen under the current President. However, all of this remains up in the air over who would come to power after Lukashenko; in this regard, there is only incredibly premature speculation, and in any case, it is likely not to be a liberal thinker.

The military doctrine, however, for the time being applies to a Belarus with Lukashenko still very much in power. And with addressing both the external and internal threat that the country could potentially face, Belarus seems to be ready for nearly any outcome; well, any outcome, save democratization.