The Republic of Belarus has approved an updated version of the country’s military doctrine, the Belarusian Telegraph Agency, the official news agency of Belarus, has stated. The new military doctrine, previously updated in 2001, was approved by President Alexander Lukashenko on January 22nd this month following a meeting of the country’s Security Council.
According to Belarusian officials, the doctrine will be updated in response to the changing security threats facing the country in order to more appropriately defend Belarus. Some aspects of the doctrine that will remain the same are that the military will remain defense-oriented, and that it will only use force against aggressors if all other options have been exhausted. However, one noteworthy addition to the military doctrine is that, as well as taking into consideration external threats, internal threats were also highlighted as a growing concern, otherwise known as “hybrid wars”. This is quite a noteworthy addition to Belarus’s old doctrine, and reflects the growing concerns of the state.
A country’s military doctrine, a key document which directs when, where, and how a country’s armed forces should conduct themselves, often reflects the current events happening both in and out of the country. For example, the fact that in the military doctrine of Russia NATO expansionism is listed as a major external threat shows the widening schism between Russia and the West. It also shows the fact that NATO and the West have been of increasing concern to Vladimir Putin. Russia’s military doctrine says a lot about that country. And, for the authoritarian Eastern European nation of Belarus, its military doctrine says a lot about the country as well.
After a few years of independence, it quickly became clear that the Republic of Belarus, which has only had one “free and fair” election in its existence, was moving into the shattered Russian sphere of influence. Today, Russia remains Belarus’s most important partner, and Belarus probably remains Russia’s closest ally. Even among other post-Soviet states with close relations with Russia like Kazakhstan and Armenia, Belarus leads the group by far for having one of the most dependent relations with its neighbor to the East. It is dependent on Russia economically, through energy, and politically, as Russia often acts as a political shield to human rights abusers that criticize Belarus for its undemocratic standards.
However, despite the closeness in many areas, the relationship is far from perfect. The most recent point of contention is the entire Ukrainian Conflict, which has made Belarus much more weary of Russia’s dominance in the country. Throughout the conflict, Belarus has tried to remain as neutral and vague as possible, giving conflicting statements to not outright condemn Russia, but not defend Russia’s actions either. Although quite a few countries close to Russia have done so, Belarus has not explicitly recognized Crimea as a part of Russia. If anything, Belarus has attempted to act as a mediator in the conflict, hosting rounds of peace talks involving Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany last year.
The new military doctrine is largely in response to Ukraine. Although President Lukashenko would never in a million years state it outright, the reference to external threats in the document is almost certainly directed towards Russia rather than NATO. Since 2014, there have been mutterings among European politicians across the spectrum that Lukashenko may want to spread his country’s wings to more actively interact with other political spheres, if only so that Russia is not Belarus’s only partner. Although it would be unrealistic to believe that Belarus will become the next member of the European Union as a reformed, liberal democracy, Belarus could be trying to branch out to other parts of Europe. Too drastic a policy shift, some worry, could trigger Russia to act against its long-time ally. As President Lukashenko has said himself, “the contradictions between the Russian Federation and NATO member states have intensified, to say the least. Between them is Belarus, as if between a rock and a hard place.”
However, although there could be some signs that Russian-Belarusian relations are becoming slightly strained, the outcome or Russia becoming an immediate external threat to Belarus is unlikely to happen in the near future; at least not while Lukashenko is still in power. So the next most important part of the military doctrine is the addition of internal security threats, also referenced to as “hybrid wars”. By including this in the new doctrine, Belarus makes clear its stance on the color revolutions and popular uprisings that overthrew government regimes like the one in Ukraine in 2014, sparking the long conflict. Although such protests would be harder to undertake in tightly-restricted Belarus, the potential threat to power still has Lukashenko and other officials worried. Since the previous military doctrine was updated in 2001, there have been four governments that have been overthrown by popular protests in the post-Soviet space alone: one in Kyrgyzstan, one in Georgia, and two in Ukraine.
This is where Belarus’s Pro-Russian side comes in. Although he might be striking a tone of reconciliation with the West, at the end of the day he stays with Russia in order to protect his power. Belarus bans public gatherings and assemblies in the government due to fears that it may spark a protest. Any whiff of dissent, and officials come. Opposition figures are routinely harassed and any serious protests in the past have been brutally put down by the police. Although a color revolution in the country is not impossible, it would certainly be very difficult. And even if a popular protest was somehow able to oust Lukashenko, there is nothing stopping a covert Russian invasion of the country to force it within its sphere of influence. Although this idea may have seemed absurd five years ago, after Ukraine, it seems like a very possible course of action for Russia to take.
Belarus’s best chances for a democracy lie after Lukashenko leaves office, likely with his death. The best option for Belarus long-term would likely be if the government peacefully and gradually shifts from an authoritarian vassal of Russia into at least obtaining the most basic principles of democracy, something that would almost certainly not happen under the current President. However, all of this remains up in the air over who would come to power after Lukashenko; in this regard, there is only incredibly premature speculation, and in any case, it is likely not to be a liberal thinker.
The military doctrine, however, for the time being applies to a Belarus with Lukashenko still very much in power. And with addressing both the external and internal threat that the country could potentially face, Belarus seems to be ready for nearly any outcome; well, any outcome, save democratization.
Newborn Republic 