EU extends sanctions against Russia for Six Months

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Russian President Dmitry Medvedev (C) with President of the European Council Herman Von Rompuy (L) and President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso (R) in 2010.

Top diplomats from all 28 member states of the European Union have agreed to extend sanctions against for at least another six months until January 31, 2017, the Guardian reports. The sanctions were originally imposed almost two years ago back in 2014 along with the United States and other Western countries in an attempt to punish Russia economically for its actions in Eastern Ukraine and the disputed Crimean Peninsula. However, even though all of the EU members’ ambassadors unanimously approved the extension of these sanctions, some cracks have begun to show in the consensus of the political union’s handling of Russia.

The European Union, along with the United States and Canada, began imposing sanctions on Russia in March 2014, after Russia had seized the Crimean Peninsula and tensions were already beginning to simmer in Eastern Ukraine. EU sanctions were intensified that July in response to the downing of the Malaysian Airliner MH17, which was shot down from the sky by pro-Russian rebels using rocket launchers largely believed to be provided by Russia. These sanctions target Russian firms, energy companies, and arms makers, dealing a major blow to the Russian economy. As much as the Russian media and government would not like to admit it, the sanctions *have* had a major impact on the economy, likely contributing to the collapse of the Russian Ruble and the ongoing financial crisis in Russia as a whole.

Since the beginning of the Ukrainian Crisis, many countries have implemented sanctions against the Russian Federation, including the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Japan, and some others. However, the sanctions imposed by the European Union are a special case: instead of each individual member having its own set of sanctions list, it is uniform across the 28-member bloc. This means that regardless of each member’s relations with Russia, they will have the same sanctions implemented against them. To put this into perspective, as Washington is deeply invested in the security of Europe, it was always bound to respond harshly to what it saw as Russian adventurism in Ukraine. A country like Japan, however, is much more removed from the region and from Ukraine in particular, and thus, although the country feels the need to implement sanctions against Russia in order to express solidarity with its allies and anger at Russian actions regardless, they would never be as strict as America’s, or even Europe’s for that matter. In addition to this, Japan’s relations with Russia are, while not without problems, significantly warmer than American-Russian relations, which, even before the conflict in Ukraine, had grown chill and uncomfortable.

Even if countries are the closest of allies, like the US and Japan, they are bound to have different foreign policy goals and relations with other countries. Despite its allies’ rhetoric, throughout the Cold War Cuba was a popular tourist destination for Canadians, and Cuba and Canada have always maintained good and even amicable relations. The same is true for the European Union: and despite being linked politically, the 28 member states of the EU each have distinct, if oftentimes intersecting, foreign policy agendas. And throughout the implementation of European sanctions on Russia, the differing foreign policy objectives of the EU’s members have moved into the spotlight.

Despite the unanimous approval of the renewal of sanctions, many countries, such as Italy, Greece, Hungary, Slovakia, and others, have begun to challenge the need for the sanctions. The Greek government under Alexis Tsipras has struck a conciliatory tone towards Russia, even threatening to veto further sanctions in 2015 until European officials convinced him to back down. Hungary’s Viktor Orban has also made similar statements regarding his disapproval of the sanctions. And Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi was even in a jovial attitude with Russian President Vladimir Putin at a St. Petersburg economic forum last week. Probably the most recent and notable story having to do with increased pro-Russian sympathies in Europe is the German Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who not only called for an easing of the EU’s sanctions against Russia, but accused NATO of “warmongering” with its exercises in the Baltic states and Poland, near the Russian border.

To be fair, the sanctions are not without their purpose. They are meant to punish Russia for their annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, which remains unrecognized by the majority of the international community, in addition to their backing of pro-Russian separatists in the Donbass region of Ukraine. And this recent extension of the sanctions is with the stated purpose to give more time to the EU to assess whether Russia is following through with its side of the Minsk agreement, a peace agreement aimed to eventually end hostilities in Eastern Ukraine and signed between Germany, France, Ukraine, and Russia. Although the Minsk deal technically remains in place, sporadic fighting has been known to occur in Eastern Ukraine, and large swaths of territory still remain under rebel control. It should be noted, however, that Russia and pro-Russian rebels are not solely to blame for the continued fighting; many in Europe have complained about Ukraine’s willingness to uphold the Minsk deal as well.

Many in Europe are already pushing for an end to the sanctions, however. And it’s easy to see why. From the refugee crisis, dealing with Turkey, the potential fallout from a Brexit vote, and even the Greek debt crisis still looming in the background, the EU does not have the time to deal with Russia as well, at least so the argument goes. And it’s not like Europe has remained unscathed from the sanctions as well; Russia in kind implemented sanctions against the EU and other Western countries, and because Russia was and still in many ways is a major trading partner, total losses for EU countries are estimated at around 100 Euros. Expectations are rising that EU sanctions against Russia could be lifted as early as 2017. And truthfully, this may not be a bad thing. Despite the facade of consensus in the recent extension of the sanctions, there is far from agreement in the EU on how to handle Russia. EU sanctions by default extend across the bloc; this may not be fair for countries like Hungary, Italy, Greece, and others that wish to calm relations with Russia. After the European Union sanctions are gone, there is nothing to say that individual members cannot implement their own sanctions if they so choose. It would be hard to imagine France and Germany dropping their sanctions completely, and the UK, which has been one of the most vocal advocates of the sanctions, would almost surely keep them in force, whether it decides to stay in the EU or not. But to make tough sanctions against Russia uniform would be to disregard each member state’s individual foreign policy objectives.

This, of course, does not mean that Russia should be given a free pass. In response to the lifting of sanctions, a more earnest dialogue should be made to bring peace to Ukraine in addition to settling the Crimea dispute. But these sanctions, although they have dealt a major blow to the Russian economy, have not made Russia budge in its position in Ukraine. Its support of the rebels in the east of the country has shrunken significantly, but it still maintains control of the Crimea, and is at loggerheads with Ukraine. Perhaps sanctions are not the best way to deal with Russia on this issue. Dialogue, negotiations, and agreements are, for the time being, the only clear way the European Union can work as one in order to bring peace back to Ukraine and keep Russia in line.

Georgian Vegan Cafe Comes Under Attack

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Protesters against an anti-homophobia rally in Tbilisi in 2013

Last week, a vegan cafe located in the capital of Georgia, a nation in the Southern Caucasus, was assaulted by protesters who wielded sausages and other meats, causing a noticeable disturbance. According to the New York Times, the attackers refused to leave the establishment and even pelted the customers to the Kiwi Cafe, the name of the restaurant, eventually leaving after the employees called the police. Many analysts see this attack as the continuance of a culture war that has been simmering in Georgia, as the conservative, Orthodox Christian country has been wrestling with traditional beliefs and Western values as the country is associating more frequently with the West.

According to witnesses eating at the Kiwi Cafe, a popular bohemian vegan restaurant for tourists and Georgians alike, customers were simply eating and watching an animated American sitcom, “Rick and Morty,” when over a dozen men entered the establishment with sausages, grilled meats, and fish, with some even having sausages draped around their necks. The attackers, who were referred to as “extremists” by the cafe owners, began smoking in their faces and throwing the meat at the patrons in an attempt to provoke them into further violence. Even though the police were called, no one was arrested, as the suspects fled before the authorities arrived. The identities of the anti-Vegan activists remain unknown, as does their motive: although it could have simply been a violent and disturbing prank, it could have also been a more meaningful protest against the acceptance of Western, liberal ideas, with vegan cafes just being a representation of those ideas.

In most large cities in the West, some restaurants that cater to vegetarians or vegans would not be an unusual sight to see; but in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi, it is quite an oddity. Ever since the 2003 Rose Revolution, which saw Georgia reassess its foreign policy and strive for European and Euro-Atlantic integration, and the brief 2008 war with Russia, which only further strengthened this policy, the country has been moving closer to the West. It has left the Commonwealth of Independent States and other similar former Soviet organizations headed by Russia, and cooperation with the NATO alliance remains high. An entire Georgian government ministry is dedication to coordinating and monitoring European integration, and Georgia seems to be finalizing a visa free travel deal with the European Union.

However, affiliation with Western organizations on the international political front does not always translate into acceptance of Western social customs. And society as a whole in Georgia still remains very conservative, with the Georgian Orthodox Church holding quite a bit of influence on the population. Even as the government has tried to, at the request of EU and American officials, liberalize aspects of Georgian society, the many conservative elements of the country have been resistant. The protesters at the Kiwi Cafe could have believed, as many traditional Georgians do, that ideas such as vegan restaurants are being imposed onto them by the West and encroach on their culture and beliefs.

Another example of this are gay rights in the country. LGBT citizens of Georgia are certainly welcome in liberal, Western-style places like the Kiwi Cafe, which reports them as frequent guests. And the government, at the request of the European Union in return for visa free travel, has adopted anti-discrimination laws that bar discrimination against people based on sexual orientation. However, while the government may like to think LGBT people are treated the same as they are in any European country, this is far from the truth. In 2013, the country’s first government-sanctioned anti-homophobia gay pride rally in Tbilisi ended in violence as protesters of the rally hurled stones at and beat the marchers. The attackers were identified as “ultra-conservative” Orthodox supporters, and even some Orthodox priests took part. The governing Georgian Dream coalition now appears to be considering a constitutional amendment which would explicitly define marriage as between a man and a woman in an attempt to win more appeal from conservative voters before October parliamentary elections.

Russia and Georgia may be hostile to one another after their 2008 war and Russia’s backing of two separatist states, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, on internationally-recognized Georgian soil, but the two have more similarities than differences when it comes to social issues. Both are tied to socially conservative values and tradition through their respective Orthodox churches and other variables. Here, Russia could potentially see an opportunity to drag Georgia back into its sphere of influence; if Georgians feel alienated by being forced to accept liberal, Western values, they may wish to retreat to a country with a set of social values they feel more comfortable. But if this happens, then political consequences will surely follow with it. Georgia is far from a clean country when it comes to corruption; however, it has made noticeable strides in recent years in dealing with corruption and graft. This is all thanks to increased transparency in the government and a real goal of liberalization. To realign the country with its northern neighbor would be to backtrack on all of this progress; most countries that decide to ally themselves with Russia tend to adopt its intensely corrupt and nontransparent form of governance.

There is nothing inherently wrong with holding onto tradition. But there is a danger when conservatives in the country begin seeing liberal and supposedly “foreign” ideas such as gay rights and, to a lesser extent, vegan cafes as threats to those traditions. And, if these new ideas were to truly replace long-held Georgian traditions, then it would be wrong. But it does not have to be one or the other. The best liberal ideas the West has to offer revolve around the inclusiveness and diversity of thought, belief, and background. This idea can, and should, be able to coexist with Georgian traditions, and should not be seen as a threat by conservative Georgians. Otherwise, there is a very real possibility that Georgia will move closer to Russia in the very near future, and then all Georgians, both liberal and conservative, will not be pleased.