Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan Reject Turkish Calls to Close Gulenist Schools

The New Comparative Advantages: Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Prime Minister of Turkey
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2006

The governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have pushed back against Turkish requests to close schools in the country linked to the Fethullah Gülen movement, the Diplomat reports. This comes less than a month after the infamous coup d’etat attempt in Turkey last July, when certain factions in the Turkish military attempted and failed to seize control from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Erdogan and his government have since blamed the coup attempt on Gülen and his allies, and the government has been pushing other countries to close schools and other institutions with links to the controversial Islamic cleric. But despite the diplomatic and cultural ties between Turkey and the two Central Asian nations, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have been reluctant to accept this request.

Fethullah Gülen is a Turkish Islamic preacher and political figure who is the founder of the Gülen Movement, an ideological Islamist network that puts an emphasis on science, interfaith dialogue, and multi-party democracy. And even though he left Turkey in 1999 to live in self-imposed exile in the United States, his presence and influence has still most certainly remained in the country and around the world. There are still millions of members of the Gülen Movement in Turkey, and many more outside of the country. And for a while, the Turkish government under Prime Minister (and now President) Erdogan had no problem with this, even considering Gülen and the members of his movement allies at one point. And it makes sense that Erdogan and Gülen would be considered partners: Erdogan and his government are Islamist-rooted, as is the Gülen movement. But this cooperation did not last, as some analysts speculate that a power struggle between Erdogan and the exiled cleric was forming in Turkey. In 2013, a major corruption scandal broke, where it was rumored that the Movement was involved in uncovering the corrupt practices of many associates of Erdogan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). After the scandal was uncovered, many protesters took to the streets calling on Erdogan to resign.

Following this incident, Erdogan viewed Gülen and his network under a much darker light. Government crackdowns surrounding people related to the Movement occurred in the following years, just as Erdogan began to consolidate power in the country and fight back against most critics against him. Erdogan’s increasingly authoritarian mode of governing culminated in the coup attempt July 15th, as well as the following days and weeks in which Erdogan has increased his purges against “enemies of the state” and blamed the coup attempt on Gülen. His government has since called on the United States to extradite him so he can stand trial in Turkey; however, since there is no proof that Gülen was involved, the US has thus far denied these requests. This, along with the most recent purges in the country and the increasingly authoritarian tendencies of President Erdogan, has led to friction with Turkey and the Western countries.

Erdogan has accused Gülen, who is now public enemy number one in the country, of establishing a parallel government in Turkey; and although this is an exaggeration, the power and influence of the Gülen Movement should not be underestimated. While the group claims not to be political in nature, it has amassed a following that is millions of people strong with schools, hospitals, cultural centers, and other institutions across the world. Now, ever since the fallout between Erdogan and Gülen, all schools related to the network in Turkey have been banned, but they still exist elsewhere. In fact, Gülen-linked institutions exist in some capacity on every single continent outside of Antarctica, with the most probably being in the United States, where Gülen resides. In Texas, Gülen schools are thought to be the largest chain of charter schools in the state. Of course, it is hard to know exactly how many of these institutions are exactly affiliated with him due to the amorphous nature of the Movement in general, but outside of the US, another major stronghold appears to be the Central Asian nations of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

Ever since the fall of the Soviet Union, the Gülen Movement saw a major opportunity in largely-Turkish Central Asia to spread its influence. Most of the countries in former-Soviet Central Asia have close cultural ties to Turkey, and in the post-Cold War era Turkey has also spread its political influence in these countries. In Uzbekistan, the government quickly set out to stomp out any institutions and influence that the network may have ever had there, even predating the Erdogan-Gülen split. And in non-Turkish Tajikistan, where the movement had gained some ground, the government banned the group under Turkish pressure last year. But elsewhere in Central Asia, the Gülen Movement has been wildly successful. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Gülen schools are considered some of the most professional in these countries and already teach thousands of students. Even though they remain the only two countries in Central Asia that host them, the region itself is another major stronghold for the Gülen network; which makes it an important target for the Turkish government.

Let us first go over the position of the Kazakh government, which, although so far denying Turkish requests to close all schools, has bent to Erdogan’s will in some way. Kazakhstan’s President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, was the first foreign leader to visit the Republic of Turkey post-coup attempt, and while there he said that “it is not in our interest to do something against Turkey” and that they had “reached an agreement.” While meeting with Erdogan, he agreed to expel any teachers in Kazakhstan with links to Gülen, but stopped short of saying that he would close all of the Gülen-affiliated schools. Read more about Nazarbayev’s visit to Turkey and response to the coup in this Reuters article here. Obviously, Kazakhstan wants to maintain good relations with a close strategic ally (Turkey), so the government is making some concessions. It is too early to say, however, if Turkey will ask for more, and if Kazakhstan is willing to close all of the Gülen schools in the country.

The reaction from the government of Kyrgyzstan was much more forceful and blunt, which came as a surprise for me personally. Kyrgyzstan, probably one of the least stable countries in post-Soviet Central Asia, has always been on edge from protests at various points in its history and even a revolution in 2005 that brought down the government. So when Ankara sent messages to Kyrgyzstan that Gülen and his network might be planning a coup in the country, they were probably expecting to be taken seriously. They were not. In response to these threats by the Turkish government, Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev stated that the notion was “absurd – to say that coup threatens Kyrgyzstan. Don’t bully us!” He even went so far as to taunt Turkey, saying that “if Turkey is so smart, why did it miss a coup?” This rebuke is surprising because Kyrgyzstan has historically reacted with hostility to anything Islamic, and the Gülen network is Islamist in nature. Just recently, Atambayev encouraged women not to wear traditional Islamist dress by suggesting that they may be hiding a bomb underneath their clothes, and that “women in mini skirts don’t become suicide bombers” (read more about that story here). But Kyrgyzstan’s protection of the Islamist Gülen movement remains, which either shows just how influential the network is in the government or how scared Kyrgyz officials are of the potential backlash that could occur if they were to close those schools. Although this is admittedly just pure speculation on my part, Atambayev is widely unpopular in Kyrgyzstan, and he may not wish to test the fates and close down institutions that provide education for thousands of Kyrgyz citizens.

Does all of this mean that Gülen’s schools will always remain open in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan? No. Kazakhstan in particular has seemed to allow some concessions for Turkey, and even though they have not gone so far as to close any of these schools, it is not out of the realm of possibilities that it may happen sometime in the near future. And although Kyrgyzstan reacted harshly to Turkey’s pressure, it could succumb to it eventually. Turkey is an important partner for Kyrgyzstan due to the immense cultural and political ties between the two. However, Turkey’s claims that Gülen may be planning a coup in Kyrgyzstan is nothing but scare tactics, and even the claim that Gülen himself was involved in the coup is baseless. There is absolutely no proof that he orchestrated it, and if there was, then the Turkish government would have already provided it so that he could be extradited from the United States. I don’t applaud those who attempted the coup in Turkey, but there is no doubt that President Erdogan is taking advantage of it to get back at his own personal rival, Gülen. Although I may not agree with the Gülenist Islamist ideology, he and his network have a right to set up these institutions unless they are threatening to overthrow the government, and while Turkey claims that Gülen is trying to do just that, once again, there is no proof that they set up these “shadow governments” as Erdogan states. I won’t deny that the Gülen Movement is not completely apolitical in nature, but it still has a right to exist. So Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and the entire international community should not give into Erdogan’s pressure to label Gülen and everyone affiliated with him as terrorists without any evidence and ban all of his institutions. Erdogan has no right to do this, and for Kyrgyzstan’s president to call him a “bully” in this regard is surprisingly very accurate.

Armenia On Edge After Hostage Situation, Clashes in Yerevan

april_8_2011_anc_protest_yerevan
A 2011 protest in Yerevan, Armenia. Recent crowds in solidarity with the hostage takers have numbered in the thousands.

A two-week standoff between gunmen occupying a police station and the government in Yerevan, Armenia ended this past Sunday when the gunmen surrendered and laid down their arms, Al-Jazeera reports. The armed group, which took control of the police station on July 17th, had previously demanded the release of Lebanese-born Armenian opposition figure Jirair Sefilian and the resignation of Armenia’s president, Serzh Sargsyan. They also held hostages intermittently throughout the standoff, and although the hostages were all eventually released unharmed, two police officers were reportedly killed, one during the initial attack on the station and one near the end of the standoff, and several people were wounded. And although the situation is now over, Armenia still remains on edge.

The altercation officially began on July 17th when 31 gunmen stormed the police station in the capital of the small South Caucasian nation and seized control, killing one police officer, wounding many, and taking 4 officers hostage. The group called themselves Sasna Tsrer, translated into English as the “Daredevils of Sasun,” and was largely made up of veterans from the Nagorno-Karabakh War in the 1990s between Armenia and Azerbaijan. After taking control of the police station, they called it the start of an “uprising” and demanded the immediate release of all political prisoners, but most notably that of Sefilian, a prominent opposition figure in the country and someone currently serving his third jail term after being arrested in June. They also called for the resignation of top government officials, including the prime minister and President Sargsyan.

Jirair Sefilian, born in Lebanon but ethnically Armenian, is a veteran of the Nagorno-Karabakh War, and played a large role in turning the tide against Azerbaijani forces in multiple battles in the conflict. He is recognized by many other veterans as a hero and an icon from the war, and was even given the First Degree Order of the Combat Cross award by the Armenian government in recognition of his contributions. However, since that point in time, the Armenian government has soured towards Sefilian as he has been heavily involved in the Armenian opposition. He is the leader of the Founding Parliament opposition group, and also the co-founder of the New Armenia Public Salvation Front, the purpose of which is to combat President Sargsyan and prevent him from enacting constitutional changes that would give him more powers. He has called Sargsyan corrupt and has called for him to resign in the past; and as he is a fairly high-profile figure, the government has tried to silence him. Officials have tried to have him deported and have revoked his Armenian citizenship, and as previously stated, he has been arrested three times, the most recent time just over a month ago in June.

This most recent arrest probably helped trigger the armed group’s seizure of the police station, although it is likely far from the only reason. Sefilian is far from the only critic of the Armenian president; Sargsyan remains deeply unpopular in Armenia, and even before this event the situation in Armenia was already tense. And as the hostage situation dragged on, these tensions only became more apparent. The group called on people to take to the streets in order to demand the current government to step down, and Armenians most certainly listened. Throughout the altercation, thousands of protesters took to the streets nightly, and as the days turned to weeks, more and more protesters came out, until it peaked to up to 20,000 people marching out in solidarity during the final nights of the occupation.

Although many of the protesters were peaceful, others reportedly turned violent, particularly as the hostage situation dragged on. This led to clashes with policemen being frequent. Some protesters went to the police station and reportedly threw stones at police officers; they were met back with tear gas. Large groups of protesters took to Baghramyan Avenue in Yerevan, the main street which leads to the official government buildings and the presidential palace, but were blocked by police who set up barbed wire on the street. On one of the final nights of the hostage situation, police and protesters had one of their largest clashes in Yerevan when riot police fired on a group of protesters and journalists with stun and flash grenades. No one was killed, but 60 people were injured, and protesters were then reportedly attacked by the police who were wielding metal rods. That’s not to say that multiple policemen were not wounded themselves during these altercations; but their brutality has been criticized by many international human rights groups, including Human Rights Watch and Reporters Without Borders, citing an excessive use of force and attacks on journalists simply reporting on the scene.

The hostage situation ended on July 31st after exactly two weeks, when the gunmen surrendered under threats from police forces the previous day that they would raid the occupied police station. According to Armenian officials, 20 gunmen who had been part of the group are now in custody, all of the hostages once held have been released, and the compound now remains unoccupied. In a final statement before their surrender, the leaders of the takeover stated that “we will continue our struggle from prison. We believe that we have achieved our goal: we became the spark that allowed people to rise up and it makes no sense to spill blood,” likely referring to the clashes between police and protesters that had taken place over the past few days. However, just because the people who initiated the crisis have backed down does not mean that the situation has dissolved. Protests in Yerevan have continued, and the atmosphere in Armenia remains tense.

The Armenian government has labeled the gunmen as terrorists; but exactly how much popular support do they have among ordinary Armenians? Although it is hard to say for sure, many Armenians at the very least share the group’s frustrations. Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan, as previously stated, is deeply unpopular in the country, and the perception he holds among Armenians has only gotten worse this year. Already the poorest country in the Southern Caucasus, Armenia’s economy has been doing poorly, and average people are feeling its side-effects. In addition to poor economic performance due to a multitude of factors, corruption in Armenia remains widespread, and earlier this year Armenia lost some territory in Nagorno-Karabakh after clashes with Azerbaijan (more on these clashes can be found in an older post of mine here). So when Sargsyan suggests changes to the Armenian constitution that would give the president more powers, Armenians naturally react negatively.

That, of course, does not excuse the violence that has occurred over the altercation or the hostage situation as a whole. Even though the initial event is over, it could potentially have dangerous repercussions for the country. As a strong believer in peaceful, civil disobedience, I applaud the decisions of any peaceful protester in Armenia who wants to stand up against the government and against the president in a nonviolent manner. But the violent occupation of a police station and the taking of hostages could leave a bad mark on the entire opposition movement in Armenia, and if instability comes to the country, it could be everyone who opposes Sargsyan that is put under scrutiny. If Armenians truly wish for the situation in their country to change, then they must peacefully protest against Sargsyan and his proposed changes to the constitution in order to kickstart a dialogue about the leadership and the corruption that exists there; but if even some people continue down this dangerous road that Sasna Tsrer has taken, then the stability of the entire country of Armenia could be at risk.