On the Escalation of Violence in Ukraine

Heavy weaponry from Ukrainian forces being withdrawn from the front line in 2015, in accordance with the Minsk II agreement. Unfortunately, they might be returning sooner rather than later.

After nearly two years of relative calm on the eastern front, renewed clashes have broken out in the Donbass region of Ukraine. Centered around the government-held city of Avdiivka, violence surged this week as government soldiers and Russian-backed rebels went head-to-head, leading to 33 dead and dozens wounded. According to international monitors, multiple civilians are included as among those dead and wounded. Although there has never truly been peace in the region since the war began, this has been the worst violence that Ukraine has seen since 2015. The violence comes during an uncertain time for Ukraine and the international community, as a new and unpredictable presidential administration in the United States is taking a warmer stance towards Russia. Now, the Ukrainians are wondering just how warm the relationship will become.

While the two sides of the conflict have regularly traded fire for a while, mass casualties on this scale, in such a short period of time as well, have been uncommon since the Minsk II protocol was implemented in February of 2015, almost two years ago. The ceasefire, while not stopping all violence, removed heavy weapons from the front lines and led to a major deescalation of the conflict, at least in comparison to the dire straights Ukraine was in beforehand. Now, however, heavy weaponry from both government forces and the separatists have reentered the front line, in a blatant violation of the Minsk II agreement. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe monitors claim that not only have heavy weapons ranging from smaller caliber mortars to launch rocket systems appeared in Avdiivka, the focal point of the new wave of fighting, but also in other key cities such as Yasynuvata and Donetsk.

The recent clashes have left the industrial city of Avdiivka, the government-held city just north of Donetsk, devastated. Although most of the fighting has been on the outskirts during the day, rebels have relentlessly begun shelling the city at night, bombs dropping indiscriminately on civilians. Even during the dead of the Ukrainian winter, many people are without power and heat due to these attacks. And now OSCE monitors worry that the city could be without water as well, as a water filtration plant on the front line is in danger of being severely damaged. But Avdiivka is only one city. If both sides continue along this violent, dangerous trajectory, then it could potentially lead to a major humanitarian catastrophe.

At this time, it is unclear which side started the escalation of fighting, as the government blames the Russian-backed rebels and vice versa. Regardless, it comes at an interesting time: just two weeks since the inauguration of US President Donald Trump, a new leader promising radical change in American policy both at home and abroad. Internationally, he has caused quite a stir by questioning the importance of major American allies, including NATO, Mexico, Australia, among others, and talking about warming relations with an old adversary: Russia.

In response to the unexpected rise of Donald Trump, Ukraine has acted cautiously, particularly in regards to his comments regarding Russia. Under the former Obama administration, President Petro Poroshenko’s government could always count on the United States for support. Since the Russian annexation of the Crimea and the outbreak of violence in Eastern Ukraine in early 2014, the US has been steadfast in their aid for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression. But with a new president that has openly questioned US sanctions against Russia in the past, the issue of Ukraine is very much up in the air. Poroshenko may have felt the need to remind President Trump that his country still needs American support, and so Russia’s and the separatists’ claims that it could have been Kyiv who renewed the recent fighting are not entirely implausible.

At the same time, it is important to look at an alternative scenario. Buoyed by the prospects of a softer American stance on Ukraine, the separatists may have felt that the time to gain ground against the government is now. Without Western support, even if it is largely diplomatic, Ukraine is left in a much weaker position, leaving it more vulnerable to attack. So Kyiv’s claims may also be accurate. Ultimately, it is very difficult to say one way or the other, as propaganda (largely from Russia, but also some from the Ukrainian government) has played a particularly significant role in this conflict. The War in Donbass has always been notorious for the high levels of misinformation and the distortion of what is true from the beginning. Although, to be fair, this is true of many recent conflicts: the Syrian Civil War, the 2016 US Presidential Election, and so on and so forth.

Since the escalation of violence in Ukraine, all eyes have turned to how the new administration has handled it. And so far, to the relief of some, the Trump administration’s policy has not been markedly different from Obama; but there are some notable differences. American Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley has already been quick to condemn Russia’s “aggressive actions” in Ukraine, and that sanctions against Russia would remain in place as long as the Crimean peninsula is still in Russian hands. However, Haley also mentioned that America did want better relations with Russia, and that it was a shame that her first appearance at the UN Security Council was a condemnation of the country. Even Russia’s UN Ambassador, Vitaly Churkin, noted calmly that there was a much different tone in comparison to just a couple weeks ago, calling her statement “friendly enough, given the circumstances.”

Notably, Haley’s condemnation of Russia was reportedly repeated in private by President Trump himself. On the sidelines of a National Prayer Breakfast this past Thursday, former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko said that she met privately with the President and Vice President Mike Pence, and that he promised that sanctions against Russia would remain in place until they pulled out of Ukraine. However, some foreign policy analysts have pointed out that Trump was much less specific in Tymoshenko’s characterization of the meeting over whether that included Crimea, which Russia considers part of the Federation and Trump has, in the past, questioned the importance of. However, Trump is certainly known to change his mind quite frequently, and Tymoshenko reportedly came out of the meeting feeling much calmer about the situation, despite ruffling some feathers in Kyiv over the leader of an opposition party meeting with the president instead of someone from Poroshenko’s party, or even Poroshenko himself. President Trump was also scheduled to talk with Poroshenko today to discuss the ongoing situation in Ukraine.

Donald Trump is certainly a very unpredictable player on the global stage. There are certainly very few guarantees as to what he is going to do during his term in office. However, from all early indicators, it looks as if President Trump will not deviate too sharply from the Obama administration’s policy in regards to Ukraine. Perhaps some administration officials will take a mildly softer tone towards Russia, as Haley did, but it is important to remember that James “Mad Dog” Mattis, a staunch opponent of Russia, is now the Secretary of Defense, and Vladimir Putin, despite his election interference, does not have many friends in a Republican-controlled Congress. If Trump were to withdraw sanctions against Russia without them backing out of Ukraine or were to suspend aid to Ukraine, then there would be an uproar across the entire American political establishment.

If I were Poroshenko, I would be much more worried about Europe’s support of Ukraine. Despite the European Union remaining firmly on Ukraine’s side in the face of Russian aggression, there has been a growing sense of frustration in capitals across Europe. Some of this frustration is quite understandable: the Poroshenko government is spectacularly corrupt and ineffective, and the Europeans are much more attune to this fact than the Americans due to being close neighbors. Last year, the Dutch overwhelmingly voted “no” on a referendum to approve the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement, which has still not been ratified as a result. Other EU countries, such as Hungary, have been openly warmer to Russia, and if the French vote in far-right presidential candidate Marine Le Pen in a couple of months, who is openly pro-Russia and has called on France to recognize Crimea as a part of Russia, then they may follow suit. Ukraine certainly has a lot to worry about; but unless something very unexpected happens, then Trump should be near the bottom of the list.

Presidential Elections in Moldova: A Future in the Balance

Leading Moldovan Presidential Candidate Igor Dodon (L)

And some people would likely have thought that I would want to talk about the United States Presidential Election, with only one week away. But instead, I would like to turn to another presidential election: Moldova. You see, in my view, everything that needs to be said about Russia’s alleged involvement in the American election has already been said, so I personally believe that it is not worth my time nor yours for me to simply regurgitate the shriveled up talking points spewed out by a host of political pundits who have no original thoughts of their own. Alternatively, however, I would like to focus on the first direct presidential election in Moldova in over twenty years, which could have lasting impacts on the small nation of three and a half million.

First, it is important to note that this election has already occurred…sort of. The election was officially held this past Sunday, October 30th, but because no one candidate got a majority of the votes, there will be a second round of voting on November 13th. Already, Moldova is in fairly uncertain territory; since a constitutional revision in 2000, the president of the country had been indirectly elected through parliament, and it was only earlier this year that a constitutional court struck this provision down, reinstating direct presidential elections. So regardless of the outcome, this election is also very important in Moldovan history as the reinstatement of the people having a direct say in who becomes their president in over twenty years, with the last direct election in Moldova occurring in 1996.

However, this election is incredibly pivotal for other reasons, particularly because of the two candidates who have garnered the most votes, as they represent two wildly different paths Moldova could go down. First, there is Igor Dodon, a candidate from the pro-Russian Socialist Party in Moldova, who was able to garner 48.5% of the vote, only narrowly missing the 50% threshold; the next closest candidate was Maia Sandu of the newly-formed pro-European party, Action and Solidarity, who gained 38.2% of the vote. These two candidates, both proposing their own distinct visions for the country’s future. Traditionally, much of the power in Moldova is held by the parliament, and the president’s main role has been to appoint judges and set foreign policy; however, due to this being the first popular presidential election in quite a long time, some experts believe that whoever becomes president later this November could hold more authority and influence than they normally have had at their disposal.

Since independence, Moldova, much like many of the less authoritarian former Soviet states, has had to perform a balancing act between Russia and the West. The country has many historical ties to Romania, which is a member of the European Union, and since the formation of a pro-EU coalition in 2009, it has been an official goal of the government to eventually join this body. Moldova, along with Georgia and Ukraine, signed an association agreement with the EU in 2014. However, Russia has always held a lot of sway in the country, not the least of which being the Russian soldiers stationed in Transnistria, an unrecognized breakaway republic on Moldova’s eastern border across the Dniester River. There is also a significant Russian minority in the country, which keeps the small Eastern European nation on Moscow’s radar. Whereas the atmosphere in Ukraine in recent years has become virulently anti-Russian, the population of Moldova has been continuously split over whether to pursue integration with the EU or deeper ties with Russia; for such a small country, there is definitely a lot of variation in this regard.

If these election results are any indication, however, the attitude in the country, while still divided, has been leaning towards a pro-Russian stance. If Igor Dodon had managed to wrangle out 1.5 more percentage points, then there would not have to be a second round, and he would have won the presidency outright. His closest competitor is over 10 percentage points behind him, and recent opinion polls in the country seem to be in his favor. This result could be due to the increasing unpopularity of the nominally pro-European government, which is largely seen as innately corrupt. Last year, Moldova was thrown into turmoil when it was revealed that in 2014 over one billion dollars, or about one eighth of the poorest country in Europe’s GDP, went missing from the banks. This led to constant street protests and the replacement of six different prime ministers in the span of a single year. Anti-corruption laws and reforms have since been passed, but deep distrust of the government among the people has remained.

Enter Igor Dodon, the pro-Russian candidate who has denounced the current government as corrupt and oligarchic. Campaigning against the Moldovan establishment and the pro-European views that they hold, he promises change. And to Moldovans disillusioned with the government, change does seem appealing. His opponent, Sandu, has also campaigned against the corruption of the government, but due to her similar views on Europe, she may be given less legitimacy as an opponent against the elite. But change in and of itself is not inherently a good thing. As seen in this article by the Daily Beast, Dodon, if president, would not just want to build closer relations with Russia; he would model his leadership styles after Vladimir Putin. Obviously, the article is trying to paint the candidate in a poor light, but if you look at his words, it is somewhat difficult to misinterpret them: “In the current anarchy that we see around, Moldova immediately needs an iron fist, a strong vertical of power”; “I will run Moldova just the same way Putin runs Russia, I assure you”; and the list goes on.

To anyone who is even mildly familiar with Eastern European politics of the last decade, this situation should remind you of Viktor Yanukovych in Ukraine. Although Dodon may be more blunt about his positions, Yanukovych came to power after campaigning in 2010 against the ineffective pro-European government in Kyiv. After he came to power, he diverted power from parliament to the presidency, strengthened the Ukrainian oligarchy and corruption, and developed closer relations with Russia. Ultimately, after many anti-European and anti-democratic policies, he was deposed in the Euromaidan Revolution in 2014. The conditions in which Yanukovych came to power were controversial, and revealed tensions between the Western and pro-Russian influences in Ukraine, just as this current election in Moldova is putting these same tensions under the national spotlight.

Am I saying that Dodon, if elected, will be overthrown in a popular revolt? Not necessarily. But it would remain a possibility. Ultimately, the election of Yanukovych led to more corruption, and undermined democracy in Ukraine as a whole; and with a polarized population, moving abruptly away from democratic principles just recently after the reinstatement of popular elections would be a dangerous move. And that is exactly what voting for Dodon would be. As a man who has explicitly threatened to walk back on the EU Association Agreement, feed power from the parliament to him a la Yanukovych, and institute a Putinist style of leadership, he should be taken very seriously.

Of course, his alternative, Sandu, does not seem to be a great candidate. Knowing the incredibly flawed political structure of Moldova, she would likely not be able to enact the changes and reforms that Moldova desperately needs. But she is much preferable to a man who has threatened the (albeit weak) democratic institutions of the country and could potentially initiate the coming of a dictatorship in the country, just as Yanukovych attempted to do. There is something inherently wrong with the Moldovan government, and it needs to be changed; Igor Dodon, however, would change it for the worst.

Uzbek President Islam Karimov Dead at 78

Former President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov (L) meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin just last year.

The first and thus far only leader of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, died this past Friday after days of confusion about his whereabouts. In the days leading up to the announcement, there had been very little information coming from the government of the restrictive Central Asian nation; but when some government officials and family members of Karimov confirmed that the president had been admitted to the hospital for a suspected brain hemorrhage, people knew that the situation was likely serious. His hospitalization was confirmed on August 28th, and rumors about his death began circulating quickly after. And although unknown government officials denied reports that the Uzbek leader had died, any other information was hard to come by. The government only confirmed Karimov’s death on the morning of September 2nd, after foreign leaders, such as the Prime Minister of Turkey, had begun to publicly send condolences to Uzbekistan for his death.

Islam Abduganiyevich Karimov was born on January 30th, 1938 in Samarkand, the third-largest city of the Uzbek SSR. He quickly moved up the ranks of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, becoming the First Secretary and leader of the Uzbek SSR in 1989. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the independence of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov was quickly elected as the president of the country by a wide margin in an election widely considered not free and unfair. Although that could be descriptive of any election in Uzbekistan’s history. Karimov quickly asserted himself as the ultimate authority in the Central Asian nation, and has gained an international reputation as being one of the harshest dictators of one of the most repressive countries on the planet. He, with help from his security forces, cracked down on all threats to his rule, from opposition politicians to non-governmental organizations to peaceful protesters, as was the case in 2005 during the Andijan massacre, where literally hundreds of anti-government protesters were slaughtered by Uzbek police.

Uzbekistan’s foreign policy under Karimov has been somewhat bipolar, particularly in relation to the West and the United States. As Uzbekistan shares a border with Afghanistan, the U.S. saw the benefits of a potential partnership with the Central Asian nation early on. At the height of American-Uzbek relations, Uzbekistan hosted American forces at a military base beginning as early as 2001; however, after Western criticisms of Uzbekistan in 2005 following the Andijan massacre, Karimov evicted American forces from the base and shifted his foreign policy to improve relations with Russia and Asia. However, this policy has remained inconsistent in recent years, with Uzbekistan withdrawing from the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization military alliance in 2012 and mild signs in recent years that Karimov may have been considering a policy of reconciliation with the West.

The inconsistent nature of his foreign policy over the years may reflect the deep paranoia that lay at the heart of the Karimov regime. As head of the most populous country in an often turbulent region, he had to choose his allies very carefully. From a civil war in neighboring Tajikistan in the 1990s, to popular uprisings in Kyrgyzstan in the 2000s, to, of course, the bloody and volatile War in Afghanistan, there was certainly a lot for Karimov to be worried about. Despite his tight grip on Uzbek society, the danger of terrorism in the country was constant. In fact, it was his rigidly-secular rule that helped spawn the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, a jihadist group that has, at various points in time, been affiliated with the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and, most recently, the Islamic State terrorist group. And although the group has been more active in Tajikistan and Afghanistan, one of their founding goals remains: to overthrow Karimov, and to instate sharia law in Uzbekistan.

Of course, Karimov’s paranoia was not exclusively limited to terrorism, but he often used it as a convenient excuse for his crackdowns on protesters and various aspects of the nearly nonexistent Uzbek civil society. He argued to his critics that an iron fist was needed to maintain stability, and thus linked the well-being of Uzbekistan to himself. Rumors have been circulating for years about the president’s health, and the government has been doing everything they can to combat them. At new years celebrations and other major events every year, Islam Karimov would perform a short, traditional dance, and although it may look somewhat silly whenever he did it, the message to the Uzbek people was clear: the president is alive and well. But in the end, only so many dances could keep Karimov alive, and now he has danced his last dance.

What happens now for Uzbekistan? Islam Karimov has been the central figure in the country for over a quarter of a century now. According to the Uzbek constitution, if the president has died or is incapacitated, the Chairman of the Senate, Nigmatilla Yuldashev, will become the acting president. However, it is highly unlikely that Yuldashev will remain president for long, as the constitution proclaims that new presidential elections must be held within three months of the president’s death, and there have been no indications that Yuldashev has any will to hold onto power. He has made very little, if any, public appearances or statements, and it is unlikely that he would run in any election. Some possible contenders for the presidency could be the Uzbek Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoyev, or his first deputy Rustam Azimov. Both were palm-bearers at the former president’s funeral on Saturday. However, Mirziyoyev is seen as the likelier of the two to become president, as he has more of a public persona and was the official chairman of the funeral commission for Karimov. Information remains scant at this point in time, and it is not helped by the secretive manner in which the Uzbek government functions, but it would not be unreasonable to believe that Mirziyoyev could become the next president of Uzbekistan (read more about Mirziyoyev and Karimov’s funeral in this BBC article here).

Depending on Mirziyoyev’s leadership tactics, it could lead to something which I will personally call the “Turkmenistan Situation.” Turkmenistan’s First President, Saparmurat Niyazov, was considered just as brutal Karimov, and in more ways than not more brutal. After the 1992 “elections” in his country where he, of course, won by a landslide, he eventually decided to abolish the formal process of presidential elections and declared himself “President for Life.” However, Niyazov died in 2006. And although Niyazov portrayed himself throughout Turkmenistan as the savior and supreme leader of the country, a successor was found, and he quickly asserted himself as the dominant force of the country. Although he is marginally less severe than his predecessor, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow is still pretty much the absolute leader of Turkmenistan and has comfortably taken Niyazov’s place.

However, despite being very close to each other, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are two very different countries. Turkmenistan is a country of about 5 million people; Uzbekistan is a country of over 31 million. Uzbekistan is in many ways a much more dynamic and unpredictable nation than Turkmenistan, with a much bumpier history with terrorism. With the death of such a central figure as Karimov, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which has largely acted outside the country of its namesake, may see an opportunity to launch attacks in Uzbekistan. Best case scenario for a nation at a very delicate moment in its young history, this could lead to political and social instability; worst case scenario, it could lead to a civil war.

Although this remains a possibility, in my mind it seems less likely then the Turkmenistan Situation, which I believe to be the most likely outcome. At the very least, however, Uzbekistan being rattled by terrorism appears to be likelier than the country actually meaningfully transforming itself into a democracy. The civil society and political will required to perform this daunting task is simply not there: it has been systematically quashed by Karimov. If it was realistic to hope for this sort of a resolution, then I would enthusiastically support it. But the reality remains that a civil war is likelier to occur in Uzbekistan than a sudden bloom in civil society engagement. The best case scenario that we can hope for, at least for the time being, is that whoever succeeds Karimov can show some authority and quietly make some modest reforms in the country. But it remains clear to any international observer that even though Islam Karimov may be dead, his legacy will have a lasting impact on the Republic of Uzbekistan.

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan Reject Turkish Calls to Close Gulenist Schools

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2006

The governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have pushed back against Turkish requests to close schools in the country linked to the Fethullah Gülen movement, the Diplomat reports. This comes less than a month after the infamous coup d’etat attempt in Turkey last July, when certain factions in the Turkish military attempted and failed to seize control from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Erdogan and his government have since blamed the coup attempt on Gülen and his allies, and the government has been pushing other countries to close schools and other institutions with links to the controversial Islamic cleric. But despite the diplomatic and cultural ties between Turkey and the two Central Asian nations, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have been reluctant to accept this request.

Fethullah Gülen is a Turkish Islamic preacher and political figure who is the founder of the Gülen Movement, an ideological Islamist network that puts an emphasis on science, interfaith dialogue, and multi-party democracy. And even though he left Turkey in 1999 to live in self-imposed exile in the United States, his presence and influence has still most certainly remained in the country and around the world. There are still millions of members of the Gülen Movement in Turkey, and many more outside of the country. And for a while, the Turkish government under Prime Minister (and now President) Erdogan had no problem with this, even considering Gülen and the members of his movement allies at one point. And it makes sense that Erdogan and Gülen would be considered partners: Erdogan and his government are Islamist-rooted, as is the Gülen movement. But this cooperation did not last, as some analysts speculate that a power struggle between Erdogan and the exiled cleric was forming in Turkey. In 2013, a major corruption scandal broke, where it was rumored that the Movement was involved in uncovering the corrupt practices of many associates of Erdogan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). After the scandal was uncovered, many protesters took to the streets calling on Erdogan to resign.

Following this incident, Erdogan viewed Gülen and his network under a much darker light. Government crackdowns surrounding people related to the Movement occurred in the following years, just as Erdogan began to consolidate power in the country and fight back against most critics against him. Erdogan’s increasingly authoritarian mode of governing culminated in the coup attempt July 15th, as well as the following days and weeks in which Erdogan has increased his purges against “enemies of the state” and blamed the coup attempt on Gülen. His government has since called on the United States to extradite him so he can stand trial in Turkey; however, since there is no proof that Gülen was involved, the US has thus far denied these requests. This, along with the most recent purges in the country and the increasingly authoritarian tendencies of President Erdogan, has led to friction with Turkey and the Western countries.

Erdogan has accused Gülen, who is now public enemy number one in the country, of establishing a parallel government in Turkey; and although this is an exaggeration, the power and influence of the Gülen Movement should not be underestimated. While the group claims not to be political in nature, it has amassed a following that is millions of people strong with schools, hospitals, cultural centers, and other institutions across the world. Now, ever since the fallout between Erdogan and Gülen, all schools related to the network in Turkey have been banned, but they still exist elsewhere. In fact, Gülen-linked institutions exist in some capacity on every single continent outside of Antarctica, with the most probably being in the United States, where Gülen resides. In Texas, Gülen schools are thought to be the largest chain of charter schools in the state. Of course, it is hard to know exactly how many of these institutions are exactly affiliated with him due to the amorphous nature of the Movement in general, but outside of the US, another major stronghold appears to be the Central Asian nations of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

Ever since the fall of the Soviet Union, the Gülen Movement saw a major opportunity in largely-Turkish Central Asia to spread its influence. Most of the countries in former-Soviet Central Asia have close cultural ties to Turkey, and in the post-Cold War era Turkey has also spread its political influence in these countries. In Uzbekistan, the government quickly set out to stomp out any institutions and influence that the network may have ever had there, even predating the Erdogan-Gülen split. And in non-Turkish Tajikistan, where the movement had gained some ground, the government banned the group under Turkish pressure last year. But elsewhere in Central Asia, the Gülen Movement has been wildly successful. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Gülen schools are considered some of the most professional in these countries and already teach thousands of students. Even though they remain the only two countries in Central Asia that host them, the region itself is another major stronghold for the Gülen network; which makes it an important target for the Turkish government.

Let us first go over the position of the Kazakh government, which, although so far denying Turkish requests to close all schools, has bent to Erdogan’s will in some way. Kazakhstan’s President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, was the first foreign leader to visit the Republic of Turkey post-coup attempt, and while there he said that “it is not in our interest to do something against Turkey” and that they had “reached an agreement.” While meeting with Erdogan, he agreed to expel any teachers in Kazakhstan with links to Gülen, but stopped short of saying that he would close all of the Gülen-affiliated schools. Read more about Nazarbayev’s visit to Turkey and response to the coup in this Reuters article here. Obviously, Kazakhstan wants to maintain good relations with a close strategic ally (Turkey), so the government is making some concessions. It is too early to say, however, if Turkey will ask for more, and if Kazakhstan is willing to close all of the Gülen schools in the country.

The reaction from the government of Kyrgyzstan was much more forceful and blunt, which came as a surprise for me personally. Kyrgyzstan, probably one of the least stable countries in post-Soviet Central Asia, has always been on edge from protests at various points in its history and even a revolution in 2005 that brought down the government. So when Ankara sent messages to Kyrgyzstan that Gülen and his network might be planning a coup in the country, they were probably expecting to be taken seriously. They were not. In response to these threats by the Turkish government, Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev stated that the notion was “absurd – to say that coup threatens Kyrgyzstan. Don’t bully us!” He even went so far as to taunt Turkey, saying that “if Turkey is so smart, why did it miss a coup?” This rebuke is surprising because Kyrgyzstan has historically reacted with hostility to anything Islamic, and the Gülen network is Islamist in nature. Just recently, Atambayev encouraged women not to wear traditional Islamist dress by suggesting that they may be hiding a bomb underneath their clothes, and that “women in mini skirts don’t become suicide bombers” (read more about that story here). But Kyrgyzstan’s protection of the Islamist Gülen movement remains, which either shows just how influential the network is in the government or how scared Kyrgyz officials are of the potential backlash that could occur if they were to close those schools. Although this is admittedly just pure speculation on my part, Atambayev is widely unpopular in Kyrgyzstan, and he may not wish to test the fates and close down institutions that provide education for thousands of Kyrgyz citizens.

Does all of this mean that Gülen’s schools will always remain open in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan? No. Kazakhstan in particular has seemed to allow some concessions for Turkey, and even though they have not gone so far as to close any of these schools, it is not out of the realm of possibilities that it may happen sometime in the near future. And although Kyrgyzstan reacted harshly to Turkey’s pressure, it could succumb to it eventually. Turkey is an important partner for Kyrgyzstan due to the immense cultural and political ties between the two. However, Turkey’s claims that Gülen may be planning a coup in Kyrgyzstan is nothing but scare tactics, and even the claim that Gülen himself was involved in the coup is baseless. There is absolutely no proof that he orchestrated it, and if there was, then the Turkish government would have already provided it so that he could be extradited from the United States. I don’t applaud those who attempted the coup in Turkey, but there is no doubt that President Erdogan is taking advantage of it to get back at his own personal rival, Gülen. Although I may not agree with the Gülenist Islamist ideology, he and his network have a right to set up these institutions unless they are threatening to overthrow the government, and while Turkey claims that Gülen is trying to do just that, once again, there is no proof that they set up these “shadow governments” as Erdogan states. I won’t deny that the Gülen Movement is not completely apolitical in nature, but it still has a right to exist. So Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and the entire international community should not give into Erdogan’s pressure to label Gülen and everyone affiliated with him as terrorists without any evidence and ban all of his institutions. Erdogan has no right to do this, and for Kyrgyzstan’s president to call him a “bully” in this regard is surprisingly very accurate.

Armenia On Edge After Hostage Situation, Clashes in Yerevan

A 2011 protest in Yerevan, Armenia. Recent crowds in solidarity with the hostage takers have numbered in the thousands.

A two-week standoff between gunmen occupying a police station and the government in Yerevan, Armenia ended this past Sunday when the gunmen surrendered and laid down their arms, Al-Jazeera reports. The armed group, which took control of the police station on July 17th, had previously demanded the release of Lebanese-born Armenian opposition figure Jirair Sefilian and the resignation of Armenia’s president, Serzh Sargsyan. They also held hostages intermittently throughout the standoff, and although the hostages were all eventually released unharmed, two police officers were reportedly killed, one during the initial attack on the station and one near the end of the standoff, and several people were wounded. And although the situation is now over, Armenia still remains on edge.

The altercation officially began on July 17th when 31 gunmen stormed the police station in the capital of the small South Caucasian nation and seized control, killing one police officer, wounding many, and taking 4 officers hostage. The group called themselves Sasna Tsrer, translated into English as the “Daredevils of Sasun,” and was largely made up of veterans from the Nagorno-Karabakh War in the 1990s between Armenia and Azerbaijan. After taking control of the police station, they called it the start of an “uprising” and demanded the immediate release of all political prisoners, but most notably that of Sefilian, a prominent opposition figure in the country and someone currently serving his third jail term after being arrested in June. They also called for the resignation of top government officials, including the prime minister and President Sargsyan.

Jirair Sefilian, born in Lebanon but ethnically Armenian, is a veteran of the Nagorno-Karabakh War, and played a large role in turning the tide against Azerbaijani forces in multiple battles in the conflict. He is recognized by many other veterans as a hero and an icon from the war, and was even given the First Degree Order of the Combat Cross award by the Armenian government in recognition of his contributions. However, since that point in time, the Armenian government has soured towards Sefilian as he has been heavily involved in the Armenian opposition. He is the leader of the Founding Parliament opposition group, and also the co-founder of the New Armenia Public Salvation Front, the purpose of which is to combat President Sargsyan and prevent him from enacting constitutional changes that would give him more powers. He has called Sargsyan corrupt and has called for him to resign in the past; and as he is a fairly high-profile figure, the government has tried to silence him. Officials have tried to have him deported and have revoked his Armenian citizenship, and as previously stated, he has been arrested three times, the most recent time just over a month ago in June.

This most recent arrest probably helped trigger the armed group’s seizure of the police station, although it is likely far from the only reason. Sefilian is far from the only critic of the Armenian president; Sargsyan remains deeply unpopular in Armenia, and even before this event the situation in Armenia was already tense. And as the hostage situation dragged on, these tensions only became more apparent. The group called on people to take to the streets in order to demand the current government to step down, and Armenians most certainly listened. Throughout the altercation, thousands of protesters took to the streets nightly, and as the days turned to weeks, more and more protesters came out, until it peaked to up to 20,000 people marching out in solidarity during the final nights of the occupation.

Although many of the protesters were peaceful, others reportedly turned violent, particularly as the hostage situation dragged on. This led to clashes with policemen being frequent. Some protesters went to the police station and reportedly threw stones at police officers; they were met back with tear gas. Large groups of protesters took to Baghramyan Avenue in Yerevan, the main street which leads to the official government buildings and the presidential palace, but were blocked by police who set up barbed wire on the street. On one of the final nights of the hostage situation, police and protesters had one of their largest clashes in Yerevan when riot police fired on a group of protesters and journalists with stun and flash grenades. No one was killed, but 60 people were injured, and protesters were then reportedly attacked by the police who were wielding metal rods. That’s not to say that multiple policemen were not wounded themselves during these altercations; but their brutality has been criticized by many international human rights groups, including Human Rights Watch and Reporters Without Borders, citing an excessive use of force and attacks on journalists simply reporting on the scene.

The hostage situation ended on July 31st after exactly two weeks, when the gunmen surrendered under threats from police forces the previous day that they would raid the occupied police station. According to Armenian officials, 20 gunmen who had been part of the group are now in custody, all of the hostages once held have been released, and the compound now remains unoccupied. In a final statement before their surrender, the leaders of the takeover stated that “we will continue our struggle from prison. We believe that we have achieved our goal: we became the spark that allowed people to rise up and it makes no sense to spill blood,” likely referring to the clashes between police and protesters that had taken place over the past few days. However, just because the people who initiated the crisis have backed down does not mean that the situation has dissolved. Protests in Yerevan have continued, and the atmosphere in Armenia remains tense.

The Armenian government has labeled the gunmen as terrorists; but exactly how much popular support do they have among ordinary Armenians? Although it is hard to say for sure, many Armenians at the very least share the group’s frustrations. Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan, as previously stated, is deeply unpopular in the country, and the perception he holds among Armenians has only gotten worse this year. Already the poorest country in the Southern Caucasus, Armenia’s economy has been doing poorly, and average people are feeling its side-effects. In addition to poor economic performance due to a multitude of factors, corruption in Armenia remains widespread, and earlier this year Armenia lost some territory in Nagorno-Karabakh after clashes with Azerbaijan (more on these clashes can be found in an older post of mine here). So when Sargsyan suggests changes to the Armenian constitution that would give the president more powers, Armenians naturally react negatively.

That, of course, does not excuse the violence that has occurred over the altercation or the hostage situation as a whole. Even though the initial event is over, it could potentially have dangerous repercussions for the country. As a strong believer in peaceful, civil disobedience, I applaud the decisions of any peaceful protester in Armenia who wants to stand up against the government and against the president in a nonviolent manner. But the violent occupation of a police station and the taking of hostages could leave a bad mark on the entire opposition movement in Armenia, and if instability comes to the country, it could be everyone who opposes Sargsyan that is put under scrutiny. If Armenians truly wish for the situation in their country to change, then they must peacefully protest against Sargsyan and his proposed changes to the constitution in order to kickstart a dialogue about the leadership and the corruption that exists there; but if even some people continue down this dangerous road that Sasna Tsrer has taken, then the stability of the entire country of Armenia could be at risk.

My Thoughts on Moldova

The Moldovan Parliament, Chisinau

Author’s Note: A few weeks ago, I was given the opportunity to visit the former Soviet republics of Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova. My last posts have been my reflections on Belarus and Ukraine. This post will cover my thoughts on Moldova, where I spent a total of three days, including a day trip to the breakaway republic of Transnistria.

Upon first glance, it is easy to not expect much from the Republic of Moldova; to be completely honest, I did not expect a lot from it either. Moldova is a small, landlocked country in Eastern Europe wedged in between Ukraine and Romania of only three and a half million. However, when I arrived in this country, I was very surprised at the levels of dynamism and vibrancy that existed in the country. I was expecting it to be very similar to Ukraine, or at least to its other neighbor Romania, with which they share a common language. But after spending some time in Moldova, I realized that it had a very distinct culture, atmosphere, and history that was really all its own.

The territory of Moldova has been passed down throughout the centuries into the hands of the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire, Romania and then finally the Soviet Union, which held onto it for good from the end of the Second World War until 1991, when Moldova gained independence. Something I had not appreciated before my visit was just the large amount of influence that Russia has historically had on this country. Although the official language of Moldova is Romanian, which is spoken by most of the population, Romania was only ever in possession of Moldova from the end of WWI, when the two territories united to form Greater Romania during the Russian Revolution, until the beginning of WWII, when the Soviet Union, under the agreement signed under the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, invaded and annexed that part of Romania as the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (when the Nazis turned against the Soviets, Romania and Germany re-invaded the territory, although at this time the Romanians were treated as occupiers). However, outside of this stretch of time from about 1920 to 1940, Russia held the territory both before and after Romania ever did; thus, much of the population also speaks Russian (at least in the capital of Chisinau, from what I’ve noticed), and many signs and documents in Moldova are also in Russian along with Romanian.

Even though Romanian and Russian both have different language roots, Moldovans seem to be much more tolerant of Russia. Perhaps not as much as Belarus, where Russian culture dominates, but certainly more so than Ukraine, where everything Russian is seen increasingly with hostility. Although Moldova’s political and social situation is more similar to Ukraine than Belarus, it has some stark differences. First and foremost, Moldova has not completely cut itself off from its neighbor like Ukraine has tried to do in the wake of the seizure of Crimea. Although Moldova also has aspiration to join the European Union, it still has decent diplomatic relations with Russia, despite some tensions, and relies on Russia for much. Russia is Moldova’s second import and export partner, after Romania, and Moldova relies almost entirely on Russia for its energy. As such, the majority of Moldovans do not hold Russia in a negative regard, especially because Russians are so intermixed within the population with much less of a distinction than there is in Ukraine.

But in many ways, Moldova is very similar to Ukraine, particularly if you look at the situation in the eastern part of each country. In Ukraine, they have to worry about the insurgents in the Donbass region; in Moldova, there is Transnistria. Also known as the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, Transnistria is a small breakaway region on the border between Moldova and Ukraine that is recognized by the international community as part of Moldova. However, it has maintained a de facto state of independence ever since the breakup of the Soviet Union and a brief war in 1992 between Moldovan forces on one side and Transnistrian forces (with the help of Russia) on the other, with the latter winning. Today, Transnistria is considered what analysts dub a “frozen conflict” zone; where these de facto countries and the country that claims them maintain the status quo of the former’s “independence,” even though no country recognizes their self-declared sovereignty. Even Russia, which Transnistria heavily relies on, technically does not recognize it as an independent country, although it maintains a military outpost on the border crossing between Transnistria and Moldova in order to “maintain order.”

As the situation in this breakaway region has died down since that war over two decades ago, I was able to visit Transnistria for a day. And even though my time there was brief, it was easy to understand why Transnistria is considered to be a “frozen conflict.” Even two decades after their brief war, Moldova is still seen as an aggressor in Transnistria, even though crossing the border between the two is relatively easy. War memorials honoring the Transnistrian lives taken in the war are everywhere, and Moldova is always painted here in a bad light. Soviet nostalgia runs rampant in this semi-country, with the official flag being the old Moldovan SSR flag with the hammer and sickle and Soviet billboards and statues of Lenin popping everywhere on the streets of Tiraspol, the capital. The main language is Russian, with Ukrainian and Moldovan also specified in its constitution. Also on the billboards are pictures of the Russian flag, with statements urging Russia to come and annex Transnistria and have it become apart of the Federation; of course, however, this is unlikely to happen. While Crimea was very strategically important to Russia, Transnistria, although it does help provide a footing for continued Russian influence in Moldova, does not have any strategic benefits for Russia that would make them consider unification. However, the notion still seems to be popular in Transnistria, just as it was in Eastern Ukraine following the annexation of Crimea.

Moldova is also similar to Ukraine in that freedom of speech is generally protected, and dissent against the government is common. Corruption is just as much of a problem in Moldova as it is in Ukraine. Walking outside the Moldovan parliament, I noticed quite a few protest tents in front of it, demanding an end to the incessant corruption within the country. In recent years, political protests have become more common in the country, from both pro-EU and pro-Russia factions. Of course, each of these groups have different ideas about the direction they want their country to take, but they still protest nonetheless.

However, the greatest thing that stood out to me the most during my time in Moldova was simply how distinct the country is. There are calls from some for the reunification of Moldova and Romania, something which I thought might be useful to help lift Moldova out of its economic woes; but now, I believe it would be a horrible idea. So would Transnistrian calls for unifying with Russia. The majority of Moldovans, I now realize, see themselves as a distinct entity. Although they have some similarities to both Romania and Russia, they are their own country and deserving of their own country. Although many aspects of Moldova’s political situation are similar to Ukraine, Moldova is unique in that it is in the precarious situation of having to juggle relations with both the European Union and Russia, as it needs both to survive economically and socially. Giving in too much to Russian influence will only encourage more corruption, but aligning too much with the EU risks alienating the Russian and pro-Russian Moldovan populations of the country, which in my view do not seem to be insignificant at all. It could also exacerbate tensions in Transnistria, where the Russian government still maintains a presence. In order to appropriately balance the two, a frank and honest political discourse is needed, and for this to happen, there needs to be more transparency and less corruption in the government. Most Moldovan government officials support EU integration, but most of this support is superficial and all they are really interested in is more political power. These corrupt officials must be weeded out for this discussion to happen on the governmental level, which naturally will take a long time.

Is the next step in Moldova a revolution? It is hard to say. But if a revolution will happen, it cannot be one-sided. It must involve all aspects of Moldovan society and political thought. And as we have seen in Ukraine, where corrupt politicians are simply replaced by other corrupt politicians, revolutions like these do not necessarily hold all of the answers. But no matter what, if Moldova is going to pull itself up from being the poorest country in Europe, change must involve everyone. And for this to happen, there are some hopeful signs. Moldovans do not seem to draw much of a distinction between each other as long as they are living in the country and call Moldova their home. Even if it may take another generation for change to occur, I am hopeful that it will eventually come to Moldova.

This concludes my reflection on my visit to these countries. Please note that these are all just my opinions on these countries, and as I only looked on as a visitor, take everything here with a grain of salt. Blog posts should be returning to normal now, and I will be covering the news in the former Soviet Union elsewhere next week. Until then, I hope you enjoyed this brief change in pace on my thoughts on each of these countries.

My Thoughts on Ukraine

Independence Square in Kyiv, Ukraine

Author’s Note: Over the past couple of weeks, I was given the unique chance of visiting the countries of Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova. These next few posts will be a reflection of my time in each of these places in the western part of the former Soviet Union, as well as my thoughts on the country as a whole. My last post, which I would recommend reading before going onto this one, is on Belarus. This post is my thoughts on Ukraine.

After my time in Minsk, I took a flight to Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine. With a population of over 40 million people, Ukraine was by far the largest country that I was able to visit, and therefore I spent the most time there. I spent my time in Ukraine mainly in Kyiv, but also visited for a time the Ukrainian seaport of Odessa, located on the Black Sea. Odessa, a majestic city with beautiful 19th century architecture everywhere to be seen, was once Ukraine’s most popular tourist destination. However, because of the war in the eastern part of the country, Odessa’s, as well as all of Ukraine’s, tourism industry has plummeted, hitting the entire country’s economy hard.

The economy is only one of the many problems facing Ukraine. Outside of the economy, one of the largest problems seemed to be the civil war in the eastern part of the country. Reminders that there was still a war going on in the country were everywhere. Outside of the obvious problem of the instability in a major industrial part of the country, the biggest outcome of the insurgency is a rise in anti-Russian sentiment all across the country. Unlike in Belarus, very few Soviet symbols and statues remain, mainly due to a new law introduced last year during the war in which all Soviet symbols were banned throughout the country. While memories of the “Great Patriotic War” remain very prominent in Belarusian society, in Ukraine the term has been outlawed. In front of Kyiv’s WWII museum (which, by the way, was renamed this past year), a tall, gleaming, stainless steel statue of a female warrior representing the Ukrainian motherland holding a sword in one hand and a shield with the Soviet emblem on the other. Its future is unknown.

Notice how I have been spelling the city as “Kyiv” with a “y,” instead of “Kiev,” the common English spelling. “Kiev” apparently comes from the Russian translation for the word, while the “Kyiv” spelling is Ukrainian. And due to the antipathy towards everything Russian, the spelling for Kiev is widely discouraged; therefore, to respect the opinions of the people that actually live in the city, I will now be spelling the city as Kyiv. But this is only one example I noticed of Ukraine trying to set itself apart from Russia. Many times I heard about the long history of the Ukrainian nation, dating back to the Kievan Rus, which Ukrainians claim as the start of the Ukrainian and Slavic people as a whole. In comparison to Belarus, where a sense of national identity was hardly even present, Ukrainians are different in that they are very proud and vocal about their heritage, and they are increasingly separating their history from the history of Russia. That’s not to say that Ukrainians did not do this before the 2014 revolution and the start of the insurgency; they are just doing it more so than ever now.

Speaking of the 2014 revolution, otherwise known as the Euromaidan or, as it is known in Ukraine, the Revolution of Dignity, this event that was not so long ago still seems to remain deeply ingrained in the minds of Ukrainians; and yet, at the same time, it seems to be apart of Ukrainian history just as much as the Second World War. In Kyiv’s Independence Square, one of the main squares in the city and the center of the revolution, there are multiple memorials honoring the protesters that perished during the Euromaidan protests, which number over 100. Two-year-old bullet holes can still be seen on the light-posts on the street. And the ousted President Viktor Yanukovych’s extravagant mansion outside of the capital has been taken over by former Euromaidan protesters and turned into a public museum. And with a retro car collection, an ostrich farm, and a disgustingly rich house with chandelier pieces that cost well over one hundred thousand euros, the museum certainly has a lot to show.

…which is why the protesters-turned-managers of the museum are fighting the Ukrainian government on keeping control of the former mansion, as the government would almost surely close it down. This mistrust represents, in my opinion, the biggest problem facing Ukraine: pessimism, disappointment, and even hatred towards the government and government officials in general. This is not unfounded in the slightest. Like in many former Soviet governments, including Russia, corruption plagues every layer of politics, policy, and society as a whole. When I was fortunately able to meet with a former Euromaidan protester, I asked him whether he thought the situation surrounding corruption had gotten any better since the revolution two years ago; he replied by saying that the levels of corruption in the government were the same, even after Yanukovych, a man who is corruption incarnate, fled the country.

The difference back then was that under Viktor Yanukovych, the corruption was on the surface. Today, corruption is buried underneath, burrowing in the ground; but that doesn’t mean the stench of it can’t be smelled. On the surface, the government is trying to fight corruption. At border checkpoints, you can see signs in multiple languages in an effort to fight against giving bribes. But progress in this fight is slow, and major government officials seem to be unable or unwilling (or both) to make serious steps to fight this systematic corruption. Of course, it is important to be somewhat fair to the government: there are no easy steps to combat this, and corruption exists in all forms of government. Even in my home, the United States, corruption is very real. But the levels of corruption that exist in Ukraine come to a point where they paralyze the government, stall important reforms that a majority of the population approve of, and act like a plague that affects everything and everyone. It runs so deep that overthrowing a single leader (whether it be Yanukovych or Petro Poroshenko, the current president) will do nothing; only a complete overhaul of the Ukrainian political system by people who believe in the ideals of a liberal democracy and the rule of law will have the potential to enact real change.

But two years after a revolution attempting to do just that, the Ukrainian population has grown pessimistic. As the old idiom goes, they simply went “one step forward, and two steps back.” Ukrainians are angry at the separatists, angry at Russia, and, most importantly, they are angry at the government. Thankfully, as they, unlike in Belarus, have freedom of expression, they have the ability to express their anger through protest and political discourse. In Odessa, there was a protest tent right outside of the governor’s residence. Nearly everyone I talked to and met in Ukraine across the entire political spectrum had something to say about the government, and it was always, without exception, something negative.

In an odd way, this gives me hope about the future of Ukraine. Despite everything, Ukrainians are incredibly patriotic towards their country. As long as this does not turn into unstable nationalism, which could hypothetically lead to the country’s sizable Russian population living in fear of their own safety, then this can be a good thing. Although the situation looks rather bleak right now, the first step to actual, tangible change in the country is for the citizens to reject the corrupt status quo and strive for something better for their country and for their people. The road is long, and there are potentially many potholes along the way. But the goal is worth it, and if the people of Ukraine love their country, then they will continue to fight for their children and for the future of their beautiful country.

My Thoughts on Belarus

A statue at the Khatyn Memorial site, where an entire Belarusian village was wiped out by the Nazis during the Khatyn Massacre of World War II.

Author’s Note: For the past two weeks, I have been away visiting Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova in order to learn about and better understand the cultures, histories, and peoples of these places. Over the next few posts, I will cover my thoughts on each country individually, having spent a minimum of at least three days in each. This is not meant to be a travel log of every single event I did while on these trips, but more about a general reflection of each country as a whole, with me now having spent some time there, if only brief. First up is Belarus.

My first stop on my somewhat outlandish trip was the Republic of Belarus, where I stayed three days in Minsk before moving onto Kyiv in Ukraine. Although Americans are generally warmly received in the other two countries that I visited, relations between Belarus and the West as a whole have been frosty (despite some recent thawing in relations between the EU and Belarus), largely due to the authoritarian policies of the country’s president, Alexander Lukashenko. Belarus was the only country that I visited where I needed to obtain a visa, and the only one where I was warned in advance that we should assume that our rooms will be bugged. Needless to say, I knew that I had to watch what I would say.

The first thing that struck me when arriving in Minsk was how clean everything was. In comparison to all of the other cities I visited, and even compared to most American and other European cities, Minsk’s streets are nearly graffiti-free, and gum on the streets is a rare sign. Although we, thankfully, did not have to deal with any of it while we were in any of the places, statistically Minsk has the lowest rate of street crime and violence out of the four cities we visited. In Ukraine and Moldova, the most we were warned about was to watch out for political protests, which could turn unpredictable; in Belarus, there was obviously not this worry. People, our guide included, seemed much more reserved in discussing issues concerning the government and politics. This stands in stark contrast to Moldova and especially Ukraine, where nearly everyone we talked to brought up politics in nearly every conversation we had; in Belarus, however, people just did not seem the freedom nor the desire to bring up the subject. No complaints about the Belarusian government, or more importantly, Belarusian society, could be found; everything was clean and polished.

This is not to say that Minsk was lifeless. On posters and billboards across the streets, there were multiple advertisements for various American products and movies coming out. Multiple modern buildings, including a state-of-the-art national library in the shape of a rhombicuboctahedron, could be seen throughout the cities, along with dozens of construction sites for future planned projects, funded through foreign investors mainly from China and Russia, but also from Serbia, Qatar, and others. Churches have also made a surprising comeback since Soviet times, and in addition to Soviet-era war memorials to the Soviet troops, there was also a couple of monuments to victims of the Jewish concentration camps on the territory of Byelorussia during World War II. During the Soviet period, religion was prohibited, so not only were churches burned down, but the repression of the Jews in Belarus and the rest of the Soviet Union prevented recognition of the tragedy that occurred on these lands. All of this was a reminder to me that despite the current government repression of civil rights and liberties, Belarus today is still freer than it was than at any time during the USSR, bar perhaps the last couple years under glasnost and perestroika.

Something Belarus takes very seriously is its war history: in 1941, the country was overrun by the Nazis, which occupied the territory for over three years until the Soviets drove them out in 1944. The first thing that I saw when we were driving away from the Minsk International Airport was a massive needle-shaped monument to the soldiers that fought in the Great Patriotic War, with a few Soviet-era tanks in front of it. The main street was strewn with the red and green colors of the Belarusian flag, based off of the Soviet-era flag, in preparation for the Independence Day military parade on July 3rd (which, unfortunately, we had to miss). Although Belarusian independence was only technically declared later in the month, the celebration for it occurs on July 3rd to coincide with the date that Minsk was liberated from Nazi occupation. And while we didn’t stay long enough to see the actual parade, we were able to see them practice for it: one day, military planes and helicopters were flying through the sky, leaving a red and green trail behind them. I could tell that the government did not want to take any chances of something going even the slightest bit off during the parade.

Anyway, the history of the Great Patriotic War is certainly a big part of Belarus, and for good reason. The Nazi occupation was brutal, and despite occurring 75 years ago still seems to be alive in the minds of Belarusian citizens through the multiple monuments and reminders to the efforts of the partisans to liberate the country and the victims of the occupation. But the wartime is not all that is remembered in Belarus; the country has been known for its nostalgia of the Soviet period. As previously noted, its current flag, adopted in 1995, is based off of the Soviet-era flag of the republic, save the hammer and sickle. The state security force is still known by the acronym of the KGB, the only post-Soviet state, outside of the partially recognized states of Transnistria and South Ossetia, to retain that name. Although Belarusian is sometimes spoken, the most prominent language there is Russian. While there, I noticed that people did not completely whitewash the Soviet period: our guide mentioned how religious practices were banned under the USSR, and since independence efforts had been made to reintroduce religion into society. But on the whole, Soviet-era symbols are glorified and nostalgia for this time remains high.

If you look on the surface of Minsk, Belarus, the tidy appearance of the city gives off the appearance of a modern, European city. And in many ways, Minsk is more modern than I originally thought going in; when you think of Belarus, you do not necessarily think of development. And yet, despite what appears to be difficult economic times for the country, old, unkempt facilities during the Soviet period are continuously being renovated, and newer ones are being built. However, if you look a little deeper, which unfortunately you are not able to do much of while visiting, you can see that Belarus still is under an authoritarian regime; it just isn’t a totalitarian regime like it was under the Soviet Union.

There is no unifying ideology of communism that the government touts, nor does Lukashenko play on Belarusian nationalism in the country; if he did, then he wouldn’t have changed Belarus’s flag to the modified Soviet version, nor would Russian be a national language. However, what he does is promote the message of safety and stability to the people. To his critics who say, rightly so, that he is a repressive ruler that clamps down on freedom of speech in the country, he counters that without these measures, Belarus would become unstable and the country would fall into chaos. And although I detest his clampdown on the most basic rights of the Belarusian people, this much I can give to President Lukashenko: the streets of Minsk are kept safe and orderly. This, coupled with the fact that there is no clear political alternative to Lukashenko for the foreseeable future (largely thanks to Lukashenko), made me consider that perhaps it would be wise to at least wait until a coherent opposition can form in Belarus. Unfortunately, it looks as if this may take a generation at least to happen, as (again, largely thanks to Lukashenko) the people seem to either be uninterested or hesitant about entering politics.

However, traveling to the country made me realize that Belarus still maintains some connections to the West. And as stated previously, despite the government’s authoritarianism, Belarus remains a more open society than at any time during the Soviet period. Lukashenko has shown increasing signs of wanting to keep a foot in Europe, despite still remaining dependent on Russia. If Belarus continues to approach Europe, then Europe should receive the country, if cautiously. If the West can help persuade the Lukashenko regime to implement some reforms, no matter how minor, in return for some other benefits, such as the removal of certain sanctions for example, then it should. Belarus is a beautiful country, with a beautiful people; its people deserve better.

EU extends sanctions against Russia for Six Months

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev (C) with President of the European Council Herman Von Rompuy (L) and President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso (R) in 2010.

Top diplomats from all 28 member states of the European Union have agreed to extend sanctions against for at least another six months until January 31, 2017, the Guardian reports. The sanctions were originally imposed almost two years ago back in 2014 along with the United States and other Western countries in an attempt to punish Russia economically for its actions in Eastern Ukraine and the disputed Crimean Peninsula. However, even though all of the EU members’ ambassadors unanimously approved the extension of these sanctions, some cracks have begun to show in the consensus of the political union’s handling of Russia.

The European Union, along with the United States and Canada, began imposing sanctions on Russia in March 2014, after Russia had seized the Crimean Peninsula and tensions were already beginning to simmer in Eastern Ukraine. EU sanctions were intensified that July in response to the downing of the Malaysian Airliner MH17, which was shot down from the sky by pro-Russian rebels using rocket launchers largely believed to be provided by Russia. These sanctions target Russian firms, energy companies, and arms makers, dealing a major blow to the Russian economy. As much as the Russian media and government would not like to admit it, the sanctions *have* had a major impact on the economy, likely contributing to the collapse of the Russian Ruble and the ongoing financial crisis in Russia as a whole.

Since the beginning of the Ukrainian Crisis, many countries have implemented sanctions against the Russian Federation, including the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Japan, and some others. However, the sanctions imposed by the European Union are a special case: instead of each individual member having its own set of sanctions list, it is uniform across the 28-member bloc. This means that regardless of each member’s relations with Russia, they will have the same sanctions implemented against them. To put this into perspective, as Washington is deeply invested in the security of Europe, it was always bound to respond harshly to what it saw as Russian adventurism in Ukraine. A country like Japan, however, is much more removed from the region and from Ukraine in particular, and thus, although the country feels the need to implement sanctions against Russia in order to express solidarity with its allies and anger at Russian actions regardless, they would never be as strict as America’s, or even Europe’s for that matter. In addition to this, Japan’s relations with Russia are, while not without problems, significantly warmer than American-Russian relations, which, even before the conflict in Ukraine, had grown chill and uncomfortable.

Even if countries are the closest of allies, like the US and Japan, they are bound to have different foreign policy goals and relations with other countries. Despite its allies’ rhetoric, throughout the Cold War Cuba was a popular tourist destination for Canadians, and Cuba and Canada have always maintained good and even amicable relations. The same is true for the European Union: and despite being linked politically, the 28 member states of the EU each have distinct, if oftentimes intersecting, foreign policy agendas. And throughout the implementation of European sanctions on Russia, the differing foreign policy objectives of the EU’s members have moved into the spotlight.

Despite the unanimous approval of the renewal of sanctions, many countries, such as Italy, Greece, Hungary, Slovakia, and others, have begun to challenge the need for the sanctions. The Greek government under Alexis Tsipras has struck a conciliatory tone towards Russia, even threatening to veto further sanctions in 2015 until European officials convinced him to back down. Hungary’s Viktor Orban has also made similar statements regarding his disapproval of the sanctions. And Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi was even in a jovial attitude with Russian President Vladimir Putin at a St. Petersburg economic forum last week. Probably the most recent and notable story having to do with increased pro-Russian sympathies in Europe is the German Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who not only called for an easing of the EU’s sanctions against Russia, but accused NATO of “warmongering” with its exercises in the Baltic states and Poland, near the Russian border.

To be fair, the sanctions are not without their purpose. They are meant to punish Russia for their annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, which remains unrecognized by the majority of the international community, in addition to their backing of pro-Russian separatists in the Donbass region of Ukraine. And this recent extension of the sanctions is with the stated purpose to give more time to the EU to assess whether Russia is following through with its side of the Minsk agreement, a peace agreement aimed to eventually end hostilities in Eastern Ukraine and signed between Germany, France, Ukraine, and Russia. Although the Minsk deal technically remains in place, sporadic fighting has been known to occur in Eastern Ukraine, and large swaths of territory still remain under rebel control. It should be noted, however, that Russia and pro-Russian rebels are not solely to blame for the continued fighting; many in Europe have complained about Ukraine’s willingness to uphold the Minsk deal as well.

Many in Europe are already pushing for an end to the sanctions, however. And it’s easy to see why. From the refugee crisis, dealing with Turkey, the potential fallout from a Brexit vote, and even the Greek debt crisis still looming in the background, the EU does not have the time to deal with Russia as well, at least so the argument goes. And it’s not like Europe has remained unscathed from the sanctions as well; Russia in kind implemented sanctions against the EU and other Western countries, and because Russia was and still in many ways is a major trading partner, total losses for EU countries are estimated at around 100 Euros. Expectations are rising that EU sanctions against Russia could be lifted as early as 2017. And truthfully, this may not be a bad thing. Despite the facade of consensus in the recent extension of the sanctions, there is far from agreement in the EU on how to handle Russia. EU sanctions by default extend across the bloc; this may not be fair for countries like Hungary, Italy, Greece, and others that wish to calm relations with Russia. After the European Union sanctions are gone, there is nothing to say that individual members cannot implement their own sanctions if they so choose. It would be hard to imagine France and Germany dropping their sanctions completely, and the UK, which has been one of the most vocal advocates of the sanctions, would almost surely keep them in force, whether it decides to stay in the EU or not. But to make tough sanctions against Russia uniform would be to disregard each member state’s individual foreign policy objectives.

This, of course, does not mean that Russia should be given a free pass. In response to the lifting of sanctions, a more earnest dialogue should be made to bring peace to Ukraine in addition to settling the Crimea dispute. But these sanctions, although they have dealt a major blow to the Russian economy, have not made Russia budge in its position in Ukraine. Its support of the rebels in the east of the country has shrunken significantly, but it still maintains control of the Crimea, and is at loggerheads with Ukraine. Perhaps sanctions are not the best way to deal with Russia on this issue. Dialogue, negotiations, and agreements are, for the time being, the only clear way the European Union can work as one in order to bring peace back to Ukraine and keep Russia in line.

Georgian Vegan Cafe Comes Under Attack

Protesters against an anti-homophobia rally in Tbilisi in 2013

Last week, a vegan cafe located in the capital of Georgia, a nation in the Southern Caucasus, was assaulted by protesters who wielded sausages and other meats, causing a noticeable disturbance. According to the New York Times, the attackers refused to leave the establishment and even pelted the customers to the Kiwi Cafe, the name of the restaurant, eventually leaving after the employees called the police. Many analysts see this attack as the continuance of a culture war that has been simmering in Georgia, as the conservative, Orthodox Christian country has been wrestling with traditional beliefs and Western values as the country is associating more frequently with the West.

According to witnesses eating at the Kiwi Cafe, a popular bohemian vegan restaurant for tourists and Georgians alike, customers were simply eating and watching an animated American sitcom, “Rick and Morty,” when over a dozen men entered the establishment with sausages, grilled meats, and fish, with some even having sausages draped around their necks. The attackers, who were referred to as “extremists” by the cafe owners, began smoking in their faces and throwing the meat at the patrons in an attempt to provoke them into further violence. Even though the police were called, no one was arrested, as the suspects fled before the authorities arrived. The identities of the anti-Vegan activists remain unknown, as does their motive: although it could have simply been a violent and disturbing prank, it could have also been a more meaningful protest against the acceptance of Western, liberal ideas, with vegan cafes just being a representation of those ideas.

In most large cities in the West, some restaurants that cater to vegetarians or vegans would not be an unusual sight to see; but in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi, it is quite an oddity. Ever since the 2003 Rose Revolution, which saw Georgia reassess its foreign policy and strive for European and Euro-Atlantic integration, and the brief 2008 war with Russia, which only further strengthened this policy, the country has been moving closer to the West. It has left the Commonwealth of Independent States and other similar former Soviet organizations headed by Russia, and cooperation with the NATO alliance remains high. An entire Georgian government ministry is dedication to coordinating and monitoring European integration, and Georgia seems to be finalizing a visa free travel deal with the European Union.

However, affiliation with Western organizations on the international political front does not always translate into acceptance of Western social customs. And society as a whole in Georgia still remains very conservative, with the Georgian Orthodox Church holding quite a bit of influence on the population. Even as the government has tried to, at the request of EU and American officials, liberalize aspects of Georgian society, the many conservative elements of the country have been resistant. The protesters at the Kiwi Cafe could have believed, as many traditional Georgians do, that ideas such as vegan restaurants are being imposed onto them by the West and encroach on their culture and beliefs.

Another example of this are gay rights in the country. LGBT citizens of Georgia are certainly welcome in liberal, Western-style places like the Kiwi Cafe, which reports them as frequent guests. And the government, at the request of the European Union in return for visa free travel, has adopted anti-discrimination laws that bar discrimination against people based on sexual orientation. However, while the government may like to think LGBT people are treated the same as they are in any European country, this is far from the truth. In 2013, the country’s first government-sanctioned anti-homophobia gay pride rally in Tbilisi ended in violence as protesters of the rally hurled stones at and beat the marchers. The attackers were identified as “ultra-conservative” Orthodox supporters, and even some Orthodox priests took part. The governing Georgian Dream coalition now appears to be considering a constitutional amendment which would explicitly define marriage as between a man and a woman in an attempt to win more appeal from conservative voters before October parliamentary elections.

Russia and Georgia may be hostile to one another after their 2008 war and Russia’s backing of two separatist states, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, on internationally-recognized Georgian soil, but the two have more similarities than differences when it comes to social issues. Both are tied to socially conservative values and tradition through their respective Orthodox churches and other variables. Here, Russia could potentially see an opportunity to drag Georgia back into its sphere of influence; if Georgians feel alienated by being forced to accept liberal, Western values, they may wish to retreat to a country with a set of social values they feel more comfortable. But if this happens, then political consequences will surely follow with it. Georgia is far from a clean country when it comes to corruption; however, it has made noticeable strides in recent years in dealing with corruption and graft. This is all thanks to increased transparency in the government and a real goal of liberalization. To realign the country with its northern neighbor would be to backtrack on all of this progress; most countries that decide to ally themselves with Russia tend to adopt its intensely corrupt and nontransparent form of governance.

There is nothing inherently wrong with holding onto tradition. But there is a danger when conservatives in the country begin seeing liberal and supposedly “foreign” ideas such as gay rights and, to a lesser extent, vegan cafes as threats to those traditions. And, if these new ideas were to truly replace long-held Georgian traditions, then it would be wrong. But it does not have to be one or the other. The best liberal ideas the West has to offer revolve around the inclusiveness and diversity of thought, belief, and background. This idea can, and should, be able to coexist with Georgian traditions, and should not be seen as a threat by conservative Georgians. Otherwise, there is a very real possibility that Georgia will move closer to Russia in the very near future, and then all Georgians, both liberal and conservative, will not be pleased.